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I. Introduction 
 
Sometime shortly after September 11th 2001, when the World Trade Center was a pile of 
ashes, and the world suddenly had turned into a place where it came much more clear how 
large the gap between East and West, and between the rich North and the poorer South had 
become, I started wondering about prejudice and incompatibility of cultures. Most of all I felt, 
in a climate where Islam suddenly was pointed out as a source of barbarism and terrorism, 
how little I actually knew about this the third largest religion of the world and its influences 
on civil and political life in the countries considered Islamic. One often hears about the 
Islamic Law – the Sharía, and how it’s inhuman punishments and discriminatory rules, for 
example for women, are totally incompatible with our Western standards of human rights and 
”civilized” morals. But is Islamic law as such contradictory to International Human Rights, or 
are the violations of personal rights in the name of Islam rather a consequence of cruel 
regimes and historically established traditions? Is there a human rights discourse in the 
Islamic world, or is the general opinion that these westerly-based philosophies are something 
forced upon them in a neo-colonial way? My objective with this essay is to gain a deeper 
understanding of the fundaments of Islamic Law. I will try to establish whether a legal system 
based on it would be compatible with the universal human rights, as defined by the UN, or 
not. I also want to find out whether the governments of the Islamic countries have an official 
standpoint concerning human rights and international law. Achieving this turned out to be 
much more complicated than I had imagined. The Islam I came across in my research was 
very different and far more diverse than the generalized media-picture, often focused on 
furious masses of men with beard screaming ”Allah akbar” and ”Death to the US”, or 
obedient women completely covered in black burqas. Within Islam there exists numerous 
ways of interpretation. The difference between for example fundamentalism and reformism is 
in parts so large it is like dealing with two separate religions. There are also evidently very 
different levels of secularization among the Islamic countries. Saudi Arabia, one of the most 
conservative Islamic countries, has a legal system almost entirely based on Sharía, while the 
countries in North Africa, for example Tunisia and Egypt are a rather secularized. The 
comparisons made between international law and Islamic law will consequently be made at a 
much-generalized level. It also constituted a problem that most of the material available on 
the subject of Islamic law and human rights are written by western scholars and from a 
westernized perspective. I’ve tried to be as objective as possible, and consider the Islamic 
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angle too, but the difficulty in finding accurate material and of course the disadvantage of 
from the beginning having a “western” point of view complicated it further.  
 
II Method and disposition 
 Since my purpose has been to find out the position of human rights in the Islamic world, I 
chose to do so from two different angles, one theoretic and one practical. My emphasis will be 
on the theoretic one, in analyzing documents on human rights produced in an Islamic 
environment. In doing this I will try to establish a generalized standpoint on human rights in 
the light of an Islamic worldview, and analyze its compatibility with our western human 
rights. The definition of human rights I will apply, as foundation of comparison, will be that 
established by the UN in the International Bill of Human Rights1. One can of course argue 
about whether the UN documents are the only accurate way of defining which rights are 
universal and relevant to protect. But since most states have signed at least the UDHR and the 
two Covenants, and considering the fact that there really isn’t any other alternative definition 
agreed upon by a larger community, this will be my ground of comparison. Before the analyze 
of the Islamic human rights documents, I will however begin with a brief introduction to the 
history of human rights according to the definition I chosen. I will furthermore introduce the 
concept of cultural relativism. My purpose with this is not to actually discuss whether what 
we call universal human rights correctly can be applied everywhere in the world, or actually 
lay claim on being universal. Cultural relativism, as I will show, on the contrary claims that 
the UN standards rather are a western idea and that we must consider adapting a more 
culturally sensitive approach to human rights. Moral standards differ in various cultures and it 
is presumptuous of us to assume that ours necessarily are the right ones. My reason for briefly 
including the discussion on cultural relativism is the interest shown for this matter in the 
human rights discourse in later years, especially in the Middle East. Most of the documents 
included in the later analyze are produced with the purpose of being culturally adjusted 
alternatives to the UN documents. I will however refrain from taking a stand on the subject of 
whether human rights can be justified as universal. My purpose of this essay is not to prove 
cultural relativism right or wrong, I will simply uncritically presume the international standard 
of human rights as the standard I compare Islamic law against.   
Last, as the practical aspect of the subject of human rights in the Islamic world, I will try to 
establish to what extent active human rights work exists in Islamic (or rather Arabic) 
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countries, both on a governmental and non-governmental level. My main focus will be the 
existence of local and regional human rights NGOs and the obstacles they meet in their 
activity. I will also briefly discuss whether there is any human rights activity within the 
fundamentalist movements. 
 In choosing my sources I have tried to get a balance between western and Islamic scholars. It 
constituted a problem to find material from the Islamic view that was translated to English.  
Most of the material written by Muslims that I have used is by Muslims active at universities 
in the USA or Europe. Among these a liberal, reformist view on Islam is dominating, since 
not many (if any..) conservative Muslims are tied to western universities. In trying to describe 
a more conservative side of the Islamic human rights discourse, I’ve consequently had to rely 
mostly on western literature rendering the opinions of the conservatives. The Islamic human 
rights documents I’m using in my analysis are either documents that are produced at a 
governmental level, as for example the Cairo Declaration on Human Right or the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights. The other category are documents, such as the human rights 
document by Mawdudi, can be seen as authoritative doctrine since experts on Islamic law 
from western universities, such as Mayer, Dalacoura and An-Naim, often refer to them. 
 
1. Universal Human Rights 
 
1.1 The idea of universal human rights 
  
Human rights can be described as rights one has simply because one is human2. They are the 
rights to especially basic freedom and security, without which a person’s existence would be 
considered less than human3. Human rights are universal, and as such they have 
predominance over other rights given to people for other different reasons. Human rights are 
hold equally by all humans because ”being human cannot be renounced, lost, or forfeited, 
human rights are inalienable”4. This, of course, does not apply in reality. Not all people enjoy 
the same human rights in practice, but the basic idea is that they still have the same human 
rights and hold them equally and inalienably. Rights can generally be seen as the relationship 
between the right-holder and the duty-bearer. This relationship is largely under the control of 
                                                                                                                                                   
1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
2 Donally Jack , International Human Rights, Westview Press 1998, Second edition p18 
3 Dalacoura Katerina ,Islam, liberalism and human rights , I.B Tauris Publishers, New York ,1998, p 6 
4 Donally p 18 
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the right-holder, since his right is inalienable, independent of obligation and can be exercised 
after his will. 
 
 
1.2 Human Rights in theory 
The principle of individual Human Rights can be traced to primarily two strands of Western 
philosophical and political thought; natural law and the Enlightenment.5 The idea of natural 
law - a higher law that stands over the laws made by man and is binding on our conscience, 
can be found as early as in Sophocles’s Antigone. The idea was fully established by the Stoic 
philosophers in the Hellenistic period.6 They introduced the concept that there were rights and 
obligations, which belonged to the individual because of his virtue as being human rather than 
being a member of the city-state. Similar thoughts are found in the medieval Christianity, in 
particular by Thomas ab Aquino. His definition of natural law, however, emphasized the 
individual’s participation in divine law and was a guide to morality and ethics.7 The rights of 
the individual, as we understand them today, emerged with the Enlightenment. The earlier 
ideas of natural law didn’t have a political content. They didn’t determine the relationship 
between the individual and the state i.e. the right-bearer and the duty- holder. The 
Enlightenment put the individual in centre and ” divorced knowledge from revelation”8. 
During this period in Western history, beginning in the 17th century, we can see the start of 
what is going to develop into the secularized society that now is what separates us from most 
other parts of the world, where religion still plays a greater part in people’s lives. The idea of 
a natural law without a base in religion started with the English philosopher John Locke, 
probably the most important natural law theorist in modern times. Locke argued in detail that 
some rights self-evidently pertain to individuals as human beings. The most important rights 
were the rights to life, liberty and property, but the individual has given up the right to enforce 
this through a “social contract” to the state (however not given up the right itself..)9. The ideas 
of individualism and the rights of humans could also be found later in the works of other 
philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Rousseau, Montesquieu and Voltaire. It was also 
these liberal ideas that were to become the ideological foundation both of the English, 
American and French revolutions, and the different declarations and new constitutions that 
                                                
5 Dalacoura, p 6 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid  
8 Ibid  p 7 
9 Steiner & Alston,  International Human Rights in Context, Oxford University Press 2000, Second Ed,  p 324 
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followed them. The ideas of natural rights overthrew ideas such as the divine rights of kings, 
since no political regime was justified unless it satisfied the natural rights of its citizens. The 
connection between these new ideas and the revolutions of the people was obvious. The 
debate over human rights as a universal concept rooted in natural law and rationalism did 
however have many critics, also in the Western sphere. In England, for example, 
conservatives such as Burke and Hume condemned the doctrine partly in fear of that a public 
affirmation of natural rights would lead to social upheaval, or natural rights becoming a 
substitute for effective legislation10. Bentham, one of the founders of Utilitarianism, claimed 
that natural law could only be the root of “imaginary rights”, as it itself is an imaginary law. 
Real rights, he said, could only come from real laws. The utilitarian idea of the greatest 
happiness principle can lead to sacrificing the rights of some individuals to gain happiness for 
a larger group of others.11 According to this theory human rights do not have an independent 
moral statues or force.  Even John Stuart Mill, on of the greatest defenders of liberalism, 
claimed that rights are ultimately founded on utility12.  
 
One problem in the justification of human rights based in the ideas of the Enlightenment is the 
separation of nature law from God and revelation. Without being able to justify the rights of 
man as given by God and therefore absolute, the moral foundation of the theory gets more 
vulnerable and is an easy target for criticism. This disadvantage, as we will see later, is 
especially relevant in the discourse with those critics of human rights who claim them to have 
no validity in a multi-cultural world, or that a system of rights given by God, such as the 
Sharía - the Islamic law, can’t possibly be inferior to a man-made set of moral rules.  
  
1.3 Human Rights in practice 
Even though the concept of human rights is no novelty in our western sphere of ideas, it was 
not until after the systematic murders of innocent during the Second World War that human 
rights became an issue in international politics. Before that most states systematically violated 
these rights, for example the racial discrimination in the US or the violations the colonial 
empires brought about for the indigenous people of the colonies. Human rights were however 
considered a domestic political matter and intervention from other states was not an option. In 
international relations during the past three centuries the principle of sovereignty has been 
                                                
10 Steiner & Alston p 325-326 
11 Ibid p 326 
12 Ibid p 326 
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dominating. The principle has its origin in the creation of nation-states, basically during the 
Enlightenment. The duty correlative to sovereignty is non-intervention, and there was 
consequently no possibility for one state to have opinions on another state's violation of 
human rights. The discussions of humanitarian law in the beginning of the 20th century, such 
as the Laws of War expressed in the 1907 Hague Conventions, were limited to the rights of 
foreign nationals and did not limit what a state could do to its own citizens, or people in its 
colonies. There has however been a change in this during the past fifty years. The catalyst for 
human rights as a topic of international action, was as mentioned above, the Holocaust – the 
genocidal massacre of millions of innocent, mainly Jews, but also Gypsies, Communists, 
Social Democrats, homosexuals and other dissidents13. During the war there was very little 
effort made, even among the Allied, to do something to stop the massacre. This lead to a 
common feeling of guilt after the war, which in its turn led to an increased concern for human 
rights. The first step was the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials (1945-46), where leading Nazis 
where prosecuted for their crimes against humanity. In 1948, on December 9, the Convention 
on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was open for signature. The day 
after that, December 10 the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which still today is the most authoritative statement of international human 
rights norms. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a resolution and not a treaty; it 
is therefore not per se legally binding. Its drafters intended to let the resolution be followed by 
a covenant (treaty), but due to ideological rivalry, mainly over the status of economic and 
social rights, the covenant was tabled for more than a decade. In 1966 the codification was 
finally completed. It was called the International Rights Covenants and had been, as a 
consequence of the earlier indifferences, broken in two; the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
These two Covenants together with the Universal Declaration are collectively referred to as 
the International Bill of Human Rights14.  
It is however important to remember that when the UN was founded in 1945, and when the 
UDHR first was elaborated, most parts of Asia and Africa was still under Western colonial 
rule. In the mid-1960: s the UN members had doubled in less than a decade and the Afro-
Asian states founded the largest voting bloc. Let’s take a brief look at the Islamic countries, 
since the later discussion is concentrating on the dilemmas that the practical human rights 
implementation has led to in the Islamic parts of the world. In 1948 only five states of the 
                                                
13 Donally p 4 
14 Ibid p 9 
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twenty-two actual members of the Arab State League existed (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria) and only seven out of today’s forty-five members of the Islamic World 
Conference (adding Turkey and Iran)15. There was also a debate among the existing countries 
on whether approving the UDHR and thereby endorsing international human rights would be 
for Muslims to betray Islamic law and submit to Western cultural domination. In the end, 
when it came time to vote on the UDHR, Saudi-Arabia among the Muslim countries was 
alone in abstaining, joined only by South Africa and various East Bloc countries.16. The lack 
of other than western influence on the drafting of declaration of 1948 is often used as an 
argument by advocates of cultural relativism as an example of the ignorance of other 
standpoints than the western. The fact that some Muslim states actually took part in the 
drafting is on the other hand used as an argument for the opposite side. They point out that 
most states didn’t protest during the making and did ratify not only the first two covenants, 
but also later conventions on human rights. Mayer does for example mean that it on this basis 
should be difficult to maintain that Muslim Countries are outsiders to the present system of 
international law17. Muslim countries can neither be said to have a poorer record of 
ratification than non-Muslim countries. Countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, on the 
contrary have favorable records in comparison to the USA.18 
 
 After the UN had established the standards for international human rights in the International 
Bill of Human Rights, it was followed by the quest of implementation and monitoring the 
implementation. Several conventions have followed upon the initial ones, some of them well-
known such as the CEDAW (Convention of Elimination of Discrimination against Women), 
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, and the Convention on Rights of the Child. The development of human rights 
has also advanced on a non-governmental level, with the creation of NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, putting pressure on governments and other potential 
human rights violators. They also produce alternative reports on the human rights situation in 
different countries. The existence of NGOs has been of great importance since the UN, 
despite monitoring, reports and now in later years even armed interventions, hasn’t always 
been entirely successful. After the first two generations of rights; the political and civil, and 
                                                
15 Tabet Koraytem , Arabic Islamic Developments on Human Rights , Arab Law Quarterly 2001, Kluwer Law 
International Netherlands. p 256 
16Mayer Ann Elizabeth,  Islam and Human Rights – Politics and traditions, Westview Press 1999 Third edition,   
p 11 
17 Ibid  p 10 
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the economic and social rights, the development of a third and fourth generation has begun. 
With the focus changed to a more collective view, these are rights to for example peace and 
development. Third world countries often consider these rights more important to put focus 
on, then the political and civil rights that according to them gets all the attention. The same 
critic is also valid for the economic and social rights, and a changed focus to these rights is 
often mentioned as a way of increasing the interest of universal human rights at a grass-root 
level in the third world. 
 
 
2. Cultural relativism 
2.1 Universality versus relativism 
 
The concept of human rights is based on the assumption that the human rights granted the 
individual are universal and therefore applicable to all individuals on the earth. This is a 
definition generally acknowledged by most states, at least those who are members of the UN. 
Thereby one can say that the universality of human rights, which refers to universal quality or 
global acceptance of the human rights idea, is established at least in theory.19 There is 
however an ongoing discussion, not only in Muslim countries, dealing with the universalism 
of human rights. Universalism of human rights would acquire a consensus on what these 
universal values are and how to interpret and apply human rights law.   
 
For the believers in strict universalism, human rights must be the same in substance and 
application everywhere independently of cultural and religious aspects. They are often 
criticized by the advocates of cultural relativism for only seeing human rights through a 
”westernized” perspective, and assuming that the standards set by the western society are 
universal norms that can’t be compromised in other cultural spheres. This is often argued by 
non-western societies as an attempt to impose western culture and values upon other cultures, 
in an almost neo-imperialistic way.20 The cultural relativists, on the other hand, are criticized 
for giving legitimization to regimes that oppress their people and violate human rights in the 
name of culture or religion.21 There are naturally different levels between the radical 
                                                                                                                                                   
18 Mayer,  p11 
19 Baderin Mashood A., Dialogue among civilizations as a paradigm for achieving universalism in international 
human rights – a case study with Islamic Law, Asia-Pacific Journal  on Human Rights and the Law, Volume 2, 
Number 2, p 2 
20 Ibid 
21 Mayer, p 7   
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universalism and radical relativism22, which are the two extremes. Radical universalism is the 
view that all values, including human rights, are in no way modified by history and culture. 
Moral views are on the contrary entirely universal and can be implemented identically 
anywhere independently of time and place. This is of course a highly unrealistic theory and in 
its pure form hard to find advocates for. 
Radical relativism is relativism in its pure form, and presupposes that all moral values are 
determined by history, culture, economics and other social factors. This theory excludes all 
sorts of rights that everybody would be entitled to equally just as human beings.  
Between these two extremes, that might be less practically functional, there are a variety of 
different relativist positions. These can roughly be divided into two ranges; strong relativism 
and weak relativism23. The former one has the emphasis on relativity, but leaves room for that 
some values can be universal. The latter reverses the emphasis and only allows secondary 
modifications on the universal rights on cultural basis. 
 
2.2 Cultural Diversity in a Western perspective 
Cultural Relativism originated in the West in the 1920s and 1930s, as a reaction to the 
arrogance of western attitudes towards other societies. Some western anthropologists felt 
there was a need of a counter-part to the beliefs that non-western societies were inferior to 
western societies, and that they would eventually evolve along similar lines. These ideas were 
a reaction to the spread of imperialism and evolutionism in the western world during the 19th 
century.24 The relativist position is asserted to the empirical matter that the world contains an 
impressive diversity in views about right and wrong, linked to diverse underlying cultures. To 
proponents of relativism, instruments with a pretension to universality, such as the UN 
documents and conventions on human rights, may be seen as cultural imperialism attempting 
to universalize western values by making them the standard of what is right. The cultural 
relativist approach was first introduced in American anthropology by Franz Boas. The 
“Boasians” were skeptic about the universal laws of evolution, claiming that culture and not 
biology makes us25. Since the theory claimed that concepts like race and sex are cultural 
constructions, this became a rather attractive idea in the twentieth-century America, where 
racial problems were very prominent. The problem with a strictly relativist approach, where 
                                                
22 Donnelly , p 33 
23 Ibid 
24 Dalacoura , p 24 
25 Steiner & Alston,  International Human Rights in Context, Oxford University Press 2000, Second Ed, p 379 
(Adam Kuper; Culture: The anthropologist’s approach. ) 
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all moral values are connected to a certain culture, is the potentiality of a culture where no 
support of human rights exists. Later theories such as Rawl’s theory on “overlapping 
consensus”26, however claims that all cultures have some basic moral values in common. One 
can consequently find these cross-cultural universals and through them establish culturally 
sensitive rules on for example human rights. One example of a cross-cultural value is the 
universal aversion to death and injury, also called the principle of “retribution tied to 
proportionality”.27 The problem with theories based on finding a lowest common denominator 
is that some basic rights would have to be sacrificed, such as the rights of women. But the 
cultural relativist think those are the downsides we have to live with since we don’t have the 
right to decide for other cultures what values are right or wrong. Critics of the relativist view 
mean that this kind of thinking would undermine the whole idea of human rights. The 
doctrine of human rights should be a doctrine on a superior (or at least different) level and 
used to set the rules for how to deal with conflicts between other doctrines.28 
 
2.3 Islam and Cultural diversity 
In the debate on whether ethnical traditions, culture or religion have an impact on human 
rights, both in theory and practice, the Islamic culture is often referred to as being opposite the 
western ideas. Different reasons can be found for this focus. The fact that Islam is the third 
largest religion in the world, with more than a billion adherents, and is the fastest growing 
religion today is of course a contributing reason. If there should be major discrepancies 
between the attitude to human rights among Muslims in general, and the rights that have been 
declared as universal by the UN, it would mean that more than a fifth of humanity could 
question the legitimacy of these rules. 
According to Bassam Tibi 29, professor of International Relations at the University of 
Göttingen and author of several books about the clash of cultures between west and the 
Muslim world, another reason is that; 
 
” Islamic and Western worldview are not only different, but also raise the same 
claims. A politicization of these worldviews and the related claims leads to a conflict 
that could result in a Clash of Civilizations” 
 
                                                
26 Jones Peter, Human Rights and Diverse Cultures , p 34 
27 Dalacoura , p 28 
28 Jones, p 41 
29 Tibi Bassam,  Islam between Culture and Politics,  2001 Palgrave, p 214 
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What Tibi refers to is that Islam raises claims to be universal, just like Christianity does. 
Other mayor civilizations such as Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism do not lay these 
claims and can therefore easier co-exist. Christianity has however, unlike Islam, undergone 
secularization in the course of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, but the western 
civilization has kept its universal outlook. Islam still bases the claims of universality on 
religion. 
I think the focus on the relations between the Muslim world and the West as a source of 
conflict also is due to the picture that media and sometimes even politicians give of Islam as a 
religion closely connected with fundamentalism and after September 11th 2001 even 
terrorism. The fear created by a simplified view is a serious obstacle in any kind of dialogue 
between different cultures, and it also helps fundamentalist regimes to stay in power helped 
by anti-western currents. It further maintains a general belief that the two cultures stand much 
further apart then maybe they in reality do. The debate concerning human rights among 
Muslim scholars is of course as divided as that among western. On one side there are those 
who believe that human rights is a completely western idea, and any attempt to force it upon 
the non-western parts of the world is just a new form of colonization - an attempt to 
”westernize” the world. On the very opposite side there are scholars who have the will to go 
as far as to reinterpreting the religious rules to get closer to western human rights standards. 
Bassam Tibi is one of these reformists. He strongly advocates the importance of a dialogue 
between cultures, but stresses the importance for western human rights advocates to not 
compromise their opinion on what are basic human rights, and to keep trying to spread them 
to other cultures. The fact that human rights the way the UN states them might be an idea 
based in the western society doesn’t mean they are wrong for other cultures. To start 
compromising the rights in themselves would, according to him, be crucial to the doctrine as 
such30.  
Ahmed An-Na’im, another Muslim scholar who advocates Islamic reform, claims that the 
only way to resolve the conflict between Islam and the theory of human rights is by a new 
interpretation of Islam31.  
Both of these scholars are however strongly influenced by western ideas and live in exile in 
the West. Although they are important names in the human rights discourse in the West, their 
influence in the Muslim world is very small. The problem with a reinterpretation of Islam, 
                                                
30 Tibi Bassam ,Islam between Culture and Politics 
31 Tergel Alf,  Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions,  Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Uppsala 1998   
p 94 
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which maybe is to be seen as the strongest possibility to conciliate Islam with modern 
realities, is that it seeks to reform the scriptural Islam as comprised in Sharía, rather than the 
popular Islam dominating most parts of the Islamic world. This Islam is more based in 
cultural behavior and tradition then actual scripture32. Reinterpretation also meets strong 
resistance among many Muslims, some even claiming it to be blasphemy.  
In Muslim countries the development in later years has not been in the direction towards 
secularization or reformism. Instead the fundamentalist movements have grown stronger in 
many places, and the call for a “re-islamisation” has gained increased support. This process 
probably is due to different reasons, but it’s difficult to not see the connection between this 
and the anti-western currents that have been the consequence of among other things the way 
the conflict in Palestine has been handled, and the treatment of Iraq and Afghanistan in the 
USA-led war on terrorism, in which one can may question the use (or abuse..)  of 
International Law. Trying to find out the opinions on cultural relativism among conservative 
Muslim scholars is a difficult task. Much of the literature available is written by Muslims 
working at European or American universities, and doesn’t give a just picture of a general 
stand of the Islamic scholars. On the other hand, documents by not westerly-educated 
Muslims are arguing from such a different perspective from what we are used to that they are 
hard to use in a comparative study with a legal perspective. 
Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, a conservative Sunni Muslim from Pakistan, is internationally 
prominent and was active in Pakistani politics, leading a political group committed to 
reinstate an Islamic state. Mawdudi, who was a firm critic to the Western society and culture, 
died in 1979. Having written much about the application of Islam to contemporary problems, 
he is still often quoted in the debate on Islam and human right, and his work has been widely 
translated. He basically considers the Western culture as decadent and inferior to the Islamic 
culture.33 Universal human rights, as established by the UN, are according to him a Western 
idea not needed in an Islamic society. The perfect Islamic society, which should be what all 
good Muslims strive for, does automatically give humans all the liberty and freedom they 
need. His document “Human Rights in Islam”, which will be included in my later analyze, 
starts out with his explanation of the Western approach: 
 
                                                
32 Abdelmoula Adam  M, The Fundamentalistic agenda for human rights – The Sudan and Algeri, Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Winter 96, Vol 18 issue 1, p2. 
33 Tergel p 90 
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“The people in the West have the habit of attributing every good thing to themselves 
and try to prove that it is because of them that the world got this blessing, otherwise 
the world was steeped in ignorance and completely unaware of all these benefits.” 
 
The Islamic approach, he continues, is that all human rights necessary are granted by God and 
as such they can’t be withdrawn by a legislative assembly , as the rights granted by man can. 
He also claims that Western human rights are based on philosophical concepts, without any 
sanctions behind them.  
In Iran, cultural relativism has been a popular way of justifying a record of poor adherence to 
international human rights standards. In 1995, the Iranian ayatollah34 Ali Khamenei, the 
supreme leader of the Islamic Republic, urged his foreign affairs functionaries to reject the 
Western notion of human rights. He claimed that they were part of a civilization coming to its 
end, and that the system would be replaced by a universalism based on Islam: 
 
“Today the Islamic system is questioning the identity, goal and capability of the 
Western system, and the most superior Western thinkers are gradually realizing the 
tediousness of the Western system. Thus, the civilization that began with the 
Renaissance is coming close to its finale. Human beings today are searching for a 
substitute for the Western system, and the inclination toward Islam in the United 
States, Europe and Africa emanates from this situation.”35 
 
Also President Khatami has expressed similar opinions, although he was elected being a 
popular reformist.   
From the fundamentalist movements it is hard to find any theoretical writings. This is 
possibly a chosen strategy for these movements, with the aim to give the leaders a stronger 
position, leaving the members under their authority.36 Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the National 
Islamic Front in Sudan has however written about the ideology of his movement. He openly 
rejects human rights as being a product of positivist and materialist Western jurisprudence. He 
talks about a utopian Islamic society where loyalty to God is going to free the people from all 
                                                
34 Khomeini is sometimes referred to as ayatollah, and other times as Imam. Ayatollah is an honorific title for 
high-ranking Shi’ite authorities in Iran, that came into being only this century. After the revolution in –79 he 
himself gave up using the title and adopted the title of Imam. The word Imam has several different meanings in 
Islam. The leader of the congregational prayer is an Iman, but it is also the title used for the founders of the 
madhahab (the Sunna schools). For the Shi’ites the word Imam has a special significance of an intercessor, 
unique and predestined to the age that has to be recognized and followed. The so called Twelve-Imam Shi’ites 
believe in a hidden Imam will return – Khomeini not being him. (The concise encyclopedia of Islam, Cyril 
Glassé, Revised ed.  2001, Stacey International, London ) 
35 Afshari Reza, Human Rights in Iran –the abuse of Cultural Relativism, University of Pennsylvania 
Press,Philadelphia, p 4 
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chains of materialism. In such a society invoking freedoms or rights could never be a 
problem.  
Cultural relativism, in the discourse of human rights in the Islamic world, is often used as an 
argument for compromising the existing rules of human rights, or even creating a new set of 
rules based in the moral values of the Islamic religion. Examples of that are the different 
Islamic human right documents that I later will describe and analyze.  
 
3. Islam and Sharía 
 
Before starting to try to compare the Islamic law with international human rights law, it is 
essential to try to point out and explain some of the basic differences between Islam as a 
religion, and for example Christianity. I will also briefly describe the history of Muslim 
culture and politics. In his book ”Islam in the world”37 Malise Ruthven describes the essential 
difference between Christianity and Islam, as while the former is primarily the religion of 
love, Islam is rather the religion of justice. This should of course not be taken literally; 
Christians are of course not generally more loving than Muslims and Muslims not more just 
than others are. But Islam sets up rules for everyday life and behavior in a way Christianity 
doesn’t. With the Sharía, Islam has a legal system closely linked to religion – a legal system 
of purely divine source, not to be altered by man. To understand how Islam can be so closely 
connected to society and politics still today, one needs to consider the nature of the religion 
during its early years of formation. 
 
3.1 The history of Islam 
3.1.1 The Prophet 
The history of Islam starts with Muhammad ibn `Abdullah of the Banu Hashim of Quraish, 
who around 570 a c was born into one of Makka’s best families. Not much is known about his 
early years. What we do know is that his father was a merchant who died before Muhammad 
was born. According to his family's customs he spent his first years with a Bedouin tribe. The 
pure air of the desert was considered to be good for the health of children. This made him 
familiar with the special elliptical quality of speech which characterizes the style of the 
Qur’an. When Muhammad was six years old his mother Amina died, leaving Muhammad an 
orphan. He was then taken into the household of his paternal Uncle Abu Talib. At an early age 
                                                                                                                                                   
36 Abdelmoula, p 3 
37 Ruthven  Malise,  Islam in the World,  Oxford Press 1999, Second edition  p 219 
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Muhammad started working in the merchant caravan of Makka. He was a very serious and 
respected young man and earned the nickname al-Amin, the trusty one. At twenty-five he got 
married to a rich Quarishi widow, Khadija bint Khuwailid, who according to tradition was 
about forty and already the mother of several children. Despite this, she is said to have borne 
him four daughters and several sons. All his sons died in infancy. They stayed married for 
fifteen years and appear to have had a happy marriage, even though the loss of all sons must 
have been a considerable blow in a society where a man’s prestige to some extent depended 
on the number of his sons. Muhammad remained monogamous in his relation to Khadija, 
something very rare in a time where temporary marriages were not only permissible but 
socially accepted.  After Khadijas death he did however, according to tradition, marry eleven 
or even more women. He was said to have an exception from God from the rule in the Qur’an 
in which four wives per man is the upper limit. Most of his marriages had political 
significance, such as enhancing the alliance with a Bedouin tribe by marrying a daughter of 
the chief. In his forties Muhammad began spending an increasing amount of time in solitary 
contemplation in a cave in the hill of Hira, a few miles north of Makka. It was in this cave he 
first received his ”call” to prophethood, and the first of the revelations on what by the 
Muslims is called the Night of Power, the night of 26-7 Ramadan. An angel sent by God said 
to Muhammad: ”Read!”, to which he twice answered ” What shall I read?”. Finally the words 
of what by a great majority of scholars are regarded as the first Qur’anic revelation came to 
him; 
 
Read in the name of thy Sustainer who has created – 
Created man out of a germ-cell 
Read, for thy Sustainer is the Most Bountiful One 
Who has taught (man) the use of pen- 
Taught man what he did not know! (The Qur’an 96:1-5) 
 
Muhammad kept receiving divine revelations during a period of twenty-two years (610-632), 
which later where collected and written down in the Qur’an, the Holy Scripture of Islam. 
Muhammad fought for almost ten years to spread the word of God in Makka. It became 
increasingly harder, especially after the death of his protector Abu Talib, in 619. When the 
resistance turned from verbal harassment and mockery to physical persecution, Muhammad 
and two hundred of his followers emigrated to Madina. This migration; the so-called Hijra, 
was to become an important turning point in the history of Islam. The Umma, the Islamic 
community, was founded during the Madina-period and Islam took a political form. The Hijra 
 19 
took place in 622 and the Muslims chose to start their calendar from there and not from the 
birth of Muhammad, or the date of the first revelation. One important change from then on 
was that Muhammad not only held the role of a Prophet. He also became a political leader for 
the religious-political community of Madina. The Hijra was followed by years of fighting 
between the Muslims of Madina and Makka, where the Muslims step by step grew stronger 
due to Muhammad’s political and diplomatic skills.  
At his death in 632, Muhammad had not only managed to conquer Makka, but also to unit all 
of Arabia under the banner of Islam. 
 
3.1.2 The ”Rightly Guided” caliphs 
The years between 632 and 661 are known as the era of the ”Rightly Guided”- caliphs. This 
was a very turbulent time for the still young Muslim State. Non-Muslims may find it 
astonishing that this time of continuous conquest, violence and civil war is referred to by 
Muslims as a golden age. It was during this time the foundation of the new religion was laid 
down, both normatively and geographically. It is also from this era that all sources of the 
Sharía derive, and all Islamic renewal and reform, traditional as well as modernistic, has to 
find its references there. 
 
The first caliph Abu Bakr was the father of Muhammad’s favorite wife Aisha and one of the 
first converts to Islam. He had been chosen by the Prophet to lead the pilgrimage of 631 and 
also to act as Imam (or leader of the congregational prayer) during his final illness. He seems 
to have been the obvious choice as Muhammad’s successor, but according to most Sunni 
Muslims Muhammad himself died without appointing anyone to take over his position as 
leader. Abu Bakr managed to keep the Islamic State together, despite the problems in the 
repercussions of Muhammad’s death. Among other things some of the Bedouin tribes wanted 
to break free, claiming that their alliances with the Islamic states where political pacts with 
the Prophet personally. Abu Bakr reigned for only two years, and before his death in 634 he 
had designated Umar ibn al-Khattab his successor. During the reign of Umar the sporadic 
raids against revolting tribes turned into a full-scale war of conquest. At the time of his death 
in 644 the Arab raiders where reaching as far as Barqa in the West, to the central Iranian 
highlands in the East. Umar was murdered by a Persian captive, and as he lay dying he 
appointed a committee of six men of the Quraishis to choose his successor. The leading 
candidates where Uthman ibn ’Affan of the Umayyad clan, husband to one of the prophet’s 
daughters and an early convert and companion of Muhammad, and Ali the prophets first 
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cousin and husband of his daughter Fatima. Ali had been raised in the prophet’s household 
and had been closer to him than any other male relative. Uthman was chosen, probably 
because the committee wanted to make sure that the conquering of Umar would continue. Ali 
had already voiced some opinions against these policies, which he wasn’t convinced was in 
accordance with the Qur’an. Uthman turned out to be a less talented leader, lacking some of 
his predecessor authority and political skills. The period leading to his death by murder in 656 
was a turbulent time, where the Islamic State faced its first major internal crises. His death 
was followed by five years of civil war known as the first fitna. 
Ali did however become the last of the four ”Rightly Guided”-caliphs. He was a charismatic 
and energetic person, and had the support of those who had believed the caliphate should have 
stayed within the family of the prophet after his death. These Muslims, who later would be 
called the Shia-muslim (shiat-u-Ali, Ali’s Party), were very content when Ali finally received 
what was rightly his to start with. Their satisfaction and prospects didn't last long. During the 
six years Ali was caliph, two major civil wars took place. The first opposition movement was 
led by Aisha, Muhammad’s widow. With Ali’s death in 661, the era of the rightly guided 
caliphs ended. 
                                                                                                                                         
Muhammad’s strength, both as a prophet and a statesman, and the way in how Islam was not 
just a religion but also a state-like community in it’s early years, are probably parts of the 
reason to why Islam more than maybe any other religion claim to regulate all parts of the life 
of it’s adherents – including legal and political aspects. The Muslims try to find their guidance 
in life in the example of Muhammad38. When the Qur’an, Muhammad’s revelations, does not 
give an answer on how to act in a certain situation, the answer should be searched in the 
tradition and life of the prophet. Among the early Muslim scholars, law was not an 
independent, empirical study, but rather the practical aspect of the religious and social 
preaching of Mohammad. Little or no distinction was made between legal and religious 
terminology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
38 Esposito John L.  Islam - den raka vägen,  , Studentlitteratur 2001, p 35 
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3.2 Islamic law  39 
 
3.2.1 Primary sources 
When referring to “Islamic law”, we usually mean what in Arabic is called the Sharía. Sharía 
means “the right way”, and is a religiously based system of rules with its roots in the Qur’an , 
the Muslim’s holy book. The Sharía also includes the Sunna, a collection of the traditions of 
Muhammad. The Qur’an and the Sunna are accepted as infallible sources, since they are 
directly derived from the prophet’s words and actions. 
 
3.2.1.1 The Qur’an 
The Qur’an is considered to be based on divine revelation of God’s word, made by the Angel 
Gabriel to Muhammad between the years 610 and 632. The Qur’anic texts were compiled a 
couple of years after the death of Muhammad. Since the Muslims believe the Qur’an to be 
divine, it is the highest and most important source of Islamic law. The Qur’an however does 
not contain many statements that constitute rules of law capable of direct application. Out of 
the Qur’an’s about 6 200 verses, which are divided in 114 chapters in 30 main parts, only 
about three percent are dealing with questions that from our Western point of view are of 
legal nature. There are about seventy verses regulating matters of family law, about seventy 
on other civil law issues, thirty verses on penal law, twenty on public and taxation law and 
finally about twenty that has some kind of relevance in the field of international law. 
 
3.2.1.2 The Sunna 
The second most important source of law in the Sharía is called the Sunna. The Sunna is the 
tradition of Mohammad, written down in the so-called Hadith by some Muslim writers in the 
7th century. The Hadith is said to have its origin in stories about the prophet’s actions and the 
traditions of his followers. Using the Hadith as a starting point, one tries to imagine how the 
prophet would have solved a certain problem. The Hadith continued to develop during the 
                                                
39 Sources for basic information about Islamic law; 
 K. Zweigert & H. Kötz,  An Introduction to Comparative law, Third edition, , 1998 Oxford University Press 
 Bogdan Michael, Komparativ Rättskunskap, , 1996 Nordsteds Juridik 
 Ruthven Malise, Islam in the world, second edition 2000, Oxford University Press, NY 
 Nordberg Michael, Profetens folk, Tidens förlag, Stockholm 1988 
 H.A.R Gibb ”The Shari’a” (www.answering-islam.org)  
 Wikipedia Encyclopedia (www.wikipedia.org.wiki)  
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time of the first four caliphs. After the death of the fourth caliph Ali in 661, no one was 
considered to have any authoritative right of interpretation of Hadith or Sunna.  
In the 8th century, four main Sunni schools of jurisprudence established themselves in 
different parts of the Islamic world, the so-called madhahibs (sing. madhhab), the Arabic 
expression for “ways”: 
The Hanafi in the Near and Middle East was founded by Abu Hanifa (d. 767) and developed 
in Iraq. It is based on the Hadith, but have rather wide possibilities for interpretation based on 
”common sense” and analogies. The Hanafi School was the official doctrine of the Abbasid 
caliphate. 
The Maliki in North, West and Central Africa is considered of many to be the most liberal 
school. It has its roots in Medina and the Syrian schools of interpretation and was founded by 
Malik ibn Abas (d. 795). It attaches great weight to vox populi, the living tradition, rather than 
what formally is considered the Hadith. In that way the link between law and society is kept 
alive. Among other things, the Maliki school gives women more individual rights than the 
others. Countries with the intention to change their laws in a liberal way often seek their 
support in this school. 
The Shafi’i in east Africa, Malaysia and Indonesia, was founded by the famous theorist 
Muhammad al Shafi’i (Egypt d. 820), and is a strictly formalistic way of interpreting the 
Sunna. According al Shafi’i any tradition that isn’t directly traceable back to the prophet 
himself is inadmissible. To be able to know exactly how to solve a problem the way 
Mohammad did, al Shafi’i developed a complicated system of ”links of tradition” so called 
isnâd. The isnads have different values, but all have to be satisfactory to not break the chain 
back to the tradition of the prophet. Every link has to be an approved intermediary of the 
Islamic tradition, such as a companion of Muhammad or some other approved legal authority. 
Hadiths with the first link unknown, so called mursal isnâd, are permitted in for example 
Malaki, but not in the Shafi’i. 
These three where the three original Sunni schools of interpretation, and in spite of their 
formal differences and divergences in details, they grew into agreement on more important 
matters. They all in practice recognized the same sources; Qur’an, Sunna, Ijima and some 
form of analogical reason. They all recognize each other’s systems as equally orthodox. These 
three schools where followed by several other schools, often developed as a strong 
traditionalist reaction to the speculative “innovations” of the previous schools40. Most of them 
                                                
40 H.A.R Gibb ”The Shari’a” (www.answering-islam.org)  
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never gained a wide following, and only one is recognized by the other three as the fourth 
orthodox school: 
The Hanbali-school, founded by the Baghdad doctor Ahmad ibn Hanbal. It had strong 
following in Iraq and Syria until the Ottoman conquest. It was revived (under the name of 
Wahhabi) in Central Arabia, and is nowadays dominant in Saudi-Arabia. It developed from 
the Shafi’i school, and is often referred to as orthodox extremism41.  
 
There also exists two shi’istic schools of interpretation. Only 8 % of the world’s Muslims are 
Shi’a-muslims, most of them resident in Iran. The division between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims 
is the one most familiar to us in the non-Muslim parts of the world. The division was made 
after the death of Ali, the last of the rightly guided caliphs. The Shi’a Muslims puts less 
weight at the Hadith. They do acknowledge it, but the interpretation of the Hadith must be 
made by an authorized Imam42. The Shi'a Muslims believe in the return of the twelfths Imam. 
It is however important to note that Khomeini and his successors are not this kind of Imams, 
even if they often in Western media are mistaken for that43. The religious leader of the 
country does however have a very strong position in interpreting the Sharía. 
 
3.2.2 Secondary Sources of Law. 
Neither the Qur’an nor the Sunna offers a system of legal provisions, they only supplies the 
material from which a system could be constructed. In the construction of such a system a 
science of interpretation was created. The science of fiqh, the Islamic jurisprudence, has apart 
from the Qur’an and the Sunna two other roots (usul); 
Ijima – consensus among schoolar jurists, opinio juris. Ijima as a principle was enshrined in 
the Hadith in which the prophet is said to have declared that ”never will God make my 
community agree upon a wrong course”44  
Quias – systematic analogical reasoning. This is the technique in which legal experts sought 
to incorporate new situations within the divine system 
There is also a third source, which sometimes is mentioned as a part of the Sharía and at other 
times not accepted: 
 Itjihad – independent legal reasoning, is by many reformists seen as the only way to re-
interpret Islamic law to better adjust to modern ideas and society.  Conservatives does 
                                                
41 Theutenberg Bo J, Folkrätt och säkerhetspolitik, Nordstedt 1986,  p562 
42 Theutenberg, p562 
43 see footnote 34 
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however claim that the ”gate to Itjihad”, and thereby all possibility of re-interpretation, was 
closed after the tenth century.45 
 
The science of fiqh started in the second century after Hijrah, when the Islamic state 
expanded and faced several issues which were not explicitly covered in the Qur'an or the 
Sunna. Rulings based on the unanimity of Muslim scholars and direct analogy are generally 
considered to be binding. The four Sunni schools of thought, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and 
Hanbali, are identical in approximately 75% of their legal conclusions. Variances in the 
remaining questions are traceable to methodological differences in understanding or 
authentication of the primary textual evidence. Differing viewpoints sometimes exist even 
within a single school of thought.   
 
The Sharía has never been erected into a formal code, but it has been said to be a discussion 
about the duties of Muslims. Human actions are graded according to a scale of moral 
valuation. There are five main categories46: 
1. Fard, obligatory acts, omission of which constitutes a sin. 
2. Haram, forbidden acts, commission of which constitutes a sin. 
3. Mandub, recommended acts, where there is merit in doing them but no sin in omission. 
4. Makruh, undesirable acts, where there is merit in abstaining from but no sin in 
commission. 
5. Mubah, unspecified acts, neither meritorious nor sinful, whether omitted or committed. 
Some actions lead to punishment according to Islamic law. These so called hudúd-crimes are 
given much attention in the Western media, since the punishments prescribed for them in the 
Qur’an are criticized as being cruel and inhuman. The hudúd crimes include theft and 
adultery, and are punished by flogging, cutting of hands (in the case of theft) or in some case 
death. The hudúd also include gambling and drinking alcohol, but for these crimes no 
punishment is settled in the Qur’an, and they have been judged differently in various times 
and places. 
 
In practice many countries in the Middle East and North Africa maintain a dual system of 
secular courts and religious courts. The religious courts mainly regulate marriage and 
                                                                                                                                                   
44 Ruthven p 139 
45 Ibid p 143 
46 Ruthven, p149 
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inheritance. Saudi Arabia and Iran maintain religious courts for all aspects of jurisprudence. 
Sharía is also used in Sudan and Libya, and some states in northern Nigeria have reintroduced 
Sharía courts.  
 
I will later get back to the more specific Sharía-rules that constitutes a problem in the debate 
of human rights, and describe in what manner they are opposed to some of the values set 
down as international law in the different UN documents on human rights. 
 
 
4. Regional Human Rights development in theory  
 
 
Before discussing the theoretical difficulties when dealing with human rights from an Islamic 
perspective, I would like to emphasize that the comparison is based on a generalized idea of a 
Sharia-based, non-secularized system. Most Muslim countries have laws that in various ways 
are partly secularized, but since the societies are strongly influenced by the religious rules, I 
find it important to compare from a perspective of principle. 
 
 
4.1 The Theocentric versus the Anthropocentric difference  
 
One fundamental difference between Islamic and positive western law is that the former is 
based on a theocentric approach. Theocentric means having God as the central point of focus, 
while anthropocentric means putting man in that place. The former is consequently a religious 
perspective, while the later is a secular approach. In a theocentric perspective God is the 
origin of all human life, and therefore also the original granter of all human rights47. Since 
God is omnipotent, he knows what human beings know not, and human knowledge is limited 
(Qur’an 3:66). Therefore there is no reason for man to make laws to protect the individual; the 
divine law of God is perfected in the best interest of the individual and the community.        
International human rights law follows the anthropocentric approach. Being based on a 
secular philosophy, it grants the individual rights on the sole base of its humanity and makes 
no direct reference to God. Although freedom of religion is recognized as a human right, 
religion is not considered the basis for human rights. The “non-reference” to God in 
                                                
47 Baderin Mashood A., Dialogue among civilizations as a paradigm for achieving universalism in international 
human rights – a case study with Islamic Law , Asia-Pacific Journal  on Human Rights and the Law, Volume 2, 
Number 2, p22 
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international human rights documents has raised the question in the debate among Muslims, 
whether this makes the documents themselves irrelevant and non-binding under Islamic law.48 
There has been a tendency among Islamists to try to write off the UDHR as being 
incompatible with the principles of Islamic law on these premises. Those opposed to this view 
claim, that even though no direct reference to God is made, one has to see to the essence of 
the document and judge from the content whether or not it is compatible with Islamic law. Or 
as Riffat Hassan stated; 
 
 “Reference to God does not necessarily make sacred, nor does non-reference to 
God necessarily make profane any human document….a document such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which, though “secular” in terminology, 
seems to me more “religious” in essence than many “fatwas” given by Muslims and 
other religious authorities and agencies”49 
 
The Muslims have not been the only ones to advocate a reference to God concerning human 
rights. When drafting the UDHR the delegation of Brazil asked to conclude a reference to 
God in the second part of the first article which says that; 
“All human beings are born equal in dignity and rights. (Created by God in his own image 
and resemblance) They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”50  
China among others protested against this, and no reference was made. In many Islamic 
documents on human rights, which I will get back to later, this kind of reference is often 
made. The theocratic starting-point doesn’t necessarily constitute an obstacle in granting 
individual human rights. The rights we now consider universal do partly have their basis in an 
idea of natural law, which as I see it can be hard to theoretically explain and justify without 
some higher power setting the rules. A system where the laws are set by an omnipotent God 
not to be altered by man, is however inflexible when trying to compromise with other legal 
systems.    
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
48 Baderin, p23 
49 Hassan Riffat,  On Human Rights and the Qur’anic Perspective, Swidler A (ed) Human Rights in Religious 
Traditions, NY 1982, Pilgrim Press p 52  
50 The phrase in parenthesis being the addition Brazil suggested. 
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4.2 Problem areas in Islamic Human Rights Documents  
 
Before the analyze of the Islamic human rights documents I’ve chosen as relevant, I find it 
necessary to shortly comment on the areas in which the implementation of our western ideas 
find the strongest theoretical resistance. I do this since it is my opinion that in most fields 
there isn’t, at least in theory, really a discrepancy between the universal human rights as 
formulated in the UN documents, and the rights accepted as stated by God in the Qu’ran and 
other parts of the Sharía. Islam, in difference to many other religions, on the contrary has a 
rather well developed system of rights formulated in its Holy Scriptures.51 There are however 
some areas in which tradition and religious standards makes it almost impossible to 
compromise between the Western and the Islamic views on human rights. I will first describe 
these areas, and they will later be the main focus in my analysis of the Islamic human rights 
documents.  
 
4.2.1  Unequality between the sexes 
The problem area most frequently described in Western media, probably since the 
discrepancies here are obvious and often creates a problem among Muslims integrated in 
secularized societies, is the rights of  Muslim women. Islamic societies are often accused of 
extended discrimination against women. In extreme cases, such as the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, the oppression of women has been systematic and has taken the development in 
equality back to a pre-historic level in the name of Islam. The history of Islam is however not 
one of degrading treatment of women. On the contrary the Qur’an devotes considerable 
attention to women. Islam meant a significant improvement of the conditions for women in 
pre-historic Arabia, enhancing their rights and status. The Qur’an introduced reforms such as 
the prohibition of female infanticide, which earlier was a considerable problem. It permitted 
women to inherit, restricted the practice of polygamy and gave women ownership of the 
dowry, which earlier had been paid to the bride’s father. Not only did the Qur’an abolish 
previous traditions discriminating women, but it also conferred to women in the seventh 
century rights that women in the West didn’t obtain until recently52. Muslim women already 
at Mohammed’s time enjoyed full legal personality, could own and manage property and 
                                                
51 Except for the basic rights, such as the right to life and rights to justice, it is interesting to note the Sharia also 
includes an elaborate collection of rules on how to treat civilians and soldiers of the enemy at war, very similar 
to those based on the thoughts of Grotius who much later became the International Law now recognized. 
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could according to some interpretations of the Sharia achieve divorce on relatively liberal 
grounds. Contemporary Muslim feminist and reformists often argues that it isn’t reasonable 
that a religion that in the beginning aimed to remove the disabilities women suffered in pre-
historic Arabia, in later interpretation and traditions has been used as a mean to keep women 
in an inferior status.53 Both the Qur’an and the other parts of the Sharía are however written 
for a society characterized by a patriarchal family structure, where men and women had 
different roles and the man in his capacity of provider had a superior status. This standpoint 
can be found in many religions, Christianity of course included. The difference with Islam is 
that since the Sharía takes an essential part in the legal systems of a number of Islamic states 
today (at least in family law), rules which differentiates between the rights of men and women 
may still be enforced. How women’s rights are dealt with of course depends on how the 
Sharía is interpreted. The following examples are simply verses and rules that may lead to an 
unequal treatment of women, and often are used in argumentation by conservative Muslims 
who claim that an inferior position for women is a natural part of the Islamic community 
(although not necessarily due to disrespect and maltreatment, since this difference in rights 
often is defended as being in the best interest of the women and her chastity..) The verse of 
Sharía most often used to argue the inferiority of women is 2:228: ”[women] have rights 
similar to those [of men] over them in kindness, and men are a degree above them..”54 In 
verse 4:34 the male control is further connected to the fact that he is the provider of the family 
and consequently has financial power over the married woman. She shall therefore obey him: 
”Men are in charge of women, because Allah has made the one of them to excel the other, and 
because they [the men] spend of their property [for the support of women].”55 
While these verses are simply used by conservatives to state the difference between the 
genders in general, there are more concrete rules in the Qura’n in which the rights of women 
are not equal to those of men. Women are for example only entitled to half the inheritance of 
their brothers (4:11). In the case of business agreements, two female witnesses equals one 
male (2:282). There are even statements permitting the husband to beat his wife in case of her 
disobedience (4:34).  
The right of women to obtain a divorce from her husband is far more limited than that of a 
man. The only way according to Sharía, in which women have the right to a divorce is the so 
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called Khul’, where the consent of the husband is needed, or the dissolution is agreed upon by 
a judge according to Sharía rules which puts up high requirements for the women to meet.  
The right to marry is also more limited for women, since they’re only allowed to marry a 
Muslim man, while the man has the right to marry a woman of any of the religions of the 
book. Men also have the right to marry up to four women, as long as he can treat them all 
equally.  Another discrepancy is found in the rules on adultery, regulated at two separate 
places in the Qura’n (4:15 and 24:2). The later of the two stipulates the same punishment for 
women and men in case of adultery (flogging), while according to some interpretations of 
4:15 death penalty can be imposed for women if four witnesses who has witnessed the act of 
adultery can be produced.  
Conservatives often use the general statements on female inferiority and women’s 
responsibility to care for children and home, to justify the banning of women from for 
example getting a job outside the home, driving, and in some traditions even leaving the 
house without the consent of her husband. The same arguments are used to limit women’s 
possibilities to get higher education, and in lower education segregated schools are called for. 
Baring women from political participation in the name of Islam is not unusual, but the 
grounds for this in the Sharía, as in many other cases of discrimination, is being continuously 
debated.  
Another debated issue in is the hijab (veil or barrier). The hijab is mentioned in no less than 
seven places in the Qura’n, and is mostly referring to the barrier between deity and mortals 
(42:51) and between wrongdoers and the righteous (7:46, 41:5)56. Hijab is nowadays however 
used as the name of the Islamic dress-code, enforced in for example Iran, which doesn’t allow 
women to show any skin except their face and hands. This meaning of the Hijab is probably 
referring to the passages in the Qura’n according to which the wife’s of Muhammad were 
supposed to live secluded, and only were allowed to talk to male visitors from behind a screen 
(33:53). While conservatives argue this kind of seclusion to apply to all women, liberals claim 
that this only was a rule for the prophet’s wives57. Though female clothing isn’t mentioned in 
any of the verses where Hijab is contained, there are other verses treating how women should 
be dressed (ex 33:59 and 24:30-31). It is stated, among other things, that women shall cover 
themselves up in different ways, to avoid being molested and only display their ”charms” to 
their husbands. One may discuss whether the restrictions on female clothing constitute a 
restriction of their human rights. But to many women, for example in Iran where they before 
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the Islamization lived a secularized life, the new dress codes meant a considerable restriction 
in their freedom of conscience and expression, and it is also a strong symbol for the unequal 
treatment of women.58  
 
Equality between the sexes is undoubtedly one of the most complicated areas in the Muslim 
human rights discussion, and even the most liberal forces agree that the only way to have an 
internationally accepted standard of rights of women without secularization would be a severe 
re-interpretation of the Qura’n.59 
 
4.2.2 Rights of non-Muslim minorities  
Religious minorities in Islam can be separated into two categories; people of the book - ahl 
al-Kitáb (Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians) and other religious minorities. The people of the 
book have always been allowed to keep their religion without interference under a certain 
protection, so called dhimmi, as long as they pay a poll tax called jizya and ”subdues” 
(9:29)60. In pre-modern times that was a pretty tolerant policy compared to that of other 
religions. In pre-modern Sharía doctrine, the non-Muslim believers that not were ahl al-Kitáb, 
were considered polytheists or unbelievers who had to embrace Islam or die. In practice, as 
Islam expanded eastwards, the pre-modern doctrines had to be adjusted and Muslim learned 
to coexist with Hindus and other polytheists.61  According to some interpretation of Islam, 
non-Muslims may be excluded from high political positions and not allowed to serve in the 
military. The exclusion from the military does however have its foundation in the idea that no 
non-Muslim could be expected to fight the religious wars, which took place in the early days 
of Islam.  In some ways it may seem hard for non-Muslims to achieve exactly the same rights 
as Muslims in an Islamic society, if traditional Sharía rules where to be applied. Therefore the 
rights of non-Muslim are often mentioned as a problem area in the human rights discourse. 
Islam might be rather tolerant as a religion, compared to Christianity or Judaism when it 
comes to relating to other religions, but a non-secularized state will never be as open to 
religious freedom as a secularized one. Fact remains that the statue of dhimmas still is not 
exactly that of Muslims, who are the only full citizens in an Islamic state.62 
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4.2.3 Freedom of religion 
The issue with freedom of religion is a problem not as much related to the non-Muslim 
minorities in the Islamic states, but to the Muslims who may want to convert to another 
religion, or who gets accused of apostasy.  Sharía prohibits conversion from Islam to any 
other religion63. The problem with the Sharía rules on apostasy also has effects on the 
freedom of expression to a large extent, since expressing a view that the authorities find 
contravenes with their official view of Islam can lead to diverse punishments.  
 
Under the interpretations of the pre-modern jurists, apostates were to be punished by death if 
they didn’t repent and return to Islam. Blasphemy was also a punishable crime. Still today 
there are examples of fundamentalists using these interpretations, the most famous example is 
probably the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa sentencing the author Salman Rushdhie to 
death64. There are many contemporary liberal Muslims who claim that there is no direct 
statement stipulating earthly punishment for apostasy, and that it is against the principle of 
tolerance which figures prominently in the Islam value system to punish apostasy65. The verse 
2:256 in the Qura’n stating ”there is no compulsion in religion” is often quoted to support this 
and also 18:29, in which God instructed the Prophet to ”Say, the truth is from you Lord. Let 
him who will believe, and let him who will reject it..”.  
If the Sharía rules on apostasy, and those which prohibits talking about the Prophet in a 
disparaging way are applied in an Islamic state, this constitutes a restriction in the unqualified 
rights to freedom of religion and also freedom of expression called for in the UDHR and other 
international documents on human rights. 
 
4.3 Islamic documents on Human Rights    
 
International Human Rights Law relies on national law and institutions for its implementation. 
It is also often also discussed and regulated on a regional level, with the European Convention 
on Human Rights and its system with an independent Court as maybe the most accomplished 
one. In the Muslim parts of the world (mainly Arabic-Islamic, since that is our focus), there 
has of course also been regional work done in the field of human rights. Several documents 
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with the aim of adapting the universal standards of human rights to the Islamic culture have 
been produced by different organizations and through governmental cooperation. 
 
Since I’ve chosen to compare these regional documents against the UN standards for human 
rights, such as they are formulated in the International Bill of Human Rights, it is relevant to 
know to what extent the Islamic countries are parties to the these two covenants (the CCPR – 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the CESCR – International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The Arab League, which I will focus on later in the 
chapter about regional human rights development in practice, has 22 members66. Out of these 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirate and Bahrain, Mauretania, Oman and Quatar haven’t 
ratified the covenants. The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an organization 
where all the states that consider themselves Islamic are members, has 57 members including 
those of the Arab League. Except those already mentioned from the Arab League that haven’t 
ratified the two Covenants, Brunei, Comoros, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Maldives and Pakistan 
have also declined being parties to them. The countries in the OIC represent about 30% of the 
member states of the UN. They also represent 30% of the states that hasn’t ratified any of the 
Covenants. One can however note that out of the remaining 70% that haven’t ratified, almost 
¾ are small island-states in either the Caribbean or Pacific Ocean with between ten and two- 
hundred thousand inhabitants. The percentage of states without ratifications is slightly higher 
within the Arab League (27%) and the OIC (23%), than in the UN as a whole (20%)67. 
  
I will in the following chapter mention the most important regional documents from the 
Islamic world, and try to comment on how they measure up to the minimum standards that are 
set by the international community on the protection of individual human rights. The two 
latter documents, The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam and The Arab Charter of 
Human Rights68, are documents worked out by organizations on a governmental level. They 
are therefore important measurements on a general standpoint of the governments of the 
countries in the Islamic parts of the world. Before those two I will include The Universal 
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights69, a product of a non-governmental organization – the 
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Islamic Council. Since they are known to represent the interest of conservative Muslim, and 
since the document often is referred to in the debate on human rights, I’ve chosen to include 
also that human rights scheme in the analyze. Before I begin to analyze these three 
documents, which are drafted to constitute alternatives to the UN documents on human rights, 
and in one way or another are adjusted to fit Western norms, I will describe a  document, not 
produced by any government or organization. As an example of Islamic doctrine it is simply 
the theories on the subject of Islam and Human Rights by one man; Abu al-’A’la Mawdudi. 
Mawdudi. He was a prominent Pakistani Sunni religious leader and founder of the 
organization Jama’at-i-Islami, a group committed to reinstate Islamic law and establish an 
Islamic state in Pakistan. He has written several documents on the issues of Islam and 
contemporary problems, and has been widely translated70. Since there are few Islamic 
theorists who have put their thoughts into writing, I’ve found that many articles or web-pages 
connected to political Islam are quoting him, or expressing ideas very similar to his. I will 
therefore use Mawdudis’s document ”Human Rights in Islam”71, as an example of a strictly 
Islamic view of human rights in the doctrine. 
 
4.3.1 Human Rights in Islam – A. A. Mawdudi 1975 
4.3.1.1 General human rights 
The Mawdudi document is based on a series of lectures he held in 1975, and is therefore 
evidently constructed in a different way than the following documents, which are drafted with 
the purpose of eventually becoming treaties or legal documents. It is divided into four 
chapters. The first one is generally about the Western and Islamic approach to human rights. 
Chapter two is about basic human rights, and chapter three about the, according to the author, 
more extended human rights in the Islamic state. The fourth chapter is devoted to rights of the 
enemies at war, which I will exclude since it treats a whole different set of  rules in 
International law than those of the UDHR and the Covenants. 
 
The document begins with a rather harsh criticism of the Western illusion that all good must 
come from Western sources and ideas. The Western monopoly on human rights is argued 
against with the notion that no Western concept of human rights existed before the 17th 
century. The first practical proof or demonstration of these rights didn't come until the 18th 
century, through the proclamations and constitutions of America and France. In Islam there 
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have on the other hand existed human rights since the birth of the religion. Since these rights 
are sanctioned by God, the rights stated in proclamations and resolutions by the UN can’t 
even be compared to them. Rights given by men can also be withdrawn by men. They are 
rather philosophical concepts, which have no sanctions behind them. This is where 
complications for human rights advocates often arise. Since the concept of universal human 
rights is based on the idea of natural rights given to man on virtue of being human and not 
through any divine revelation, they may be hard to justify when opposed to a culture where all 
right and duties are formulated by God. It is often hard to take the discussion further than that 
in an attempt to compromise with an Islamic fundamentalist, since they don’t consider 
themselves to be in the position to alter the perfected rules of God.  
So what Human Rights are according to Mawdudi contained in the Islamic law?   
In the so-called basic rights, which include all humans not just those in an Islamic state, eight 
different rights are enumerated. I will in the presentation of these articles use the titles 
Mawdudi uses, since they show how his concept of what constitutes a right is not always 
coherent with what we would define as such: 
 
1.The right to life 
This, the most basic of all rights and also one of the opening articles in the UDHR, does not 
constitute a problem in Islamic law. It is based on verse 5:32 ”Whosoever kills a human being 
without any reason like manslaughter, or corruption on earth, it is as though he had killed all 
mankind..”72 There is however an exception to the rule in verse 6:151, where it is said that 
killing a person through the due process of law is permitted. The law referred to obviously is 
the Sharía, which would make it possible to sentence people to death according to its rules 
about apostasy. The ICCPR does on the other hand in article 6 allow countries who haven’t 
abolished death penalty, to impose it for the most serious crimes. The US can of course be 
used as an example of a Western country that still hasn’t abolished death penalty. The article 
does not define what constitutes ”the most serious crime”, except that it has to be ”in 
accordance with the law at the time of the commission of the crime”. In theory there is 
consequently no obstacle for an Islamic state, where a legal system based on Sharía is in 
force, to have death penalty on what according to that law is considered the most serious 
crime. Article 6 does however also include rules about appeal and chance of pardon. This 
might not be complied by an Islamic court, but if the death penalty is allowed in the first place 
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one can consider whether the details around it aren’t partly just rhetorical. Mawdudi does not 
stop with just establishing that the right to life for all humans is included in Islamic law, but 
claims that Islam is alone in granting this right to everybody. The Western declarations and 
constitutions pretending to do so, in reality are applicable to either only their own citizens or 
the white race alone. According to Mawdudi, the violations of rights of the aborigines and the 
Indians in America are examples of this. These kind of anti-western statements are 
unfortunately not unusual in Islamic documents, although probably triggered by the similar 
prejudice often shown against the Islamic-Arabic culture. 
 
2.The right to the safety of life 
It is according to Mawdudi a duty for all Muslims to save another human being, if his life is in 
danger and if it is within their power to save him. The thought exists in many countries 
national legislation, although maybe not in the Islamic meaning of feeding a starving man. As 
it imposes duties on individuals rather than on the state, it however doesn’t exist in any of the 
UN conventions  and a comparison with universal human rights is not possible. 
 
3.Respect for the chastity of women   
The right to chastity of women is not either a human right as understood in international law. 
The rights of women are as mentioned before one of the most complicated fields in Islamic 
law versus international human rights law. According to Mawdudi the right of respect of the 
chastity of women seems to be defined as the right of women not to be raped or in other ways 
assaulted. He refers to this right as only existing in Islam, since Western armies in all times 
have raped and abused the women of the countries they conquered. According to him this 
never existed after a conquest of a Muslim army. Whether this is true is questionable73. This is 
however not relevant for the theoretical argument. Violations of human rights in practice 
often have little to do with whether they in theory are permissible, and the crimes against 
women in wartime are hardly allowed under any legal or moral system. The respect of the 
chastity of women can however, on the contrary of actually being a right of women, constitute 
a restriction of the woman’s personal freedom. The Talibans for example argued that the 
reason to keep women secluded and enshrouded, is to make sure that her chastity is not at 
risk. The rights of women are not further discussed in Mawdudi’s human rights document. 
This is probably not a coincidence since he in many other writings has made it clear that in his 
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opinion equality of women, such as in secularized societies, only leads to promiscuity and the 
undermining of the family.74 To think that all the rights in the documents apply equally to 
women, in lack of evidence of the opposite, would consequently be too optimistic. Not 
mentioning women’s rights is rather a sign of the unwillingness to discuss the subject.
      
4.The right to a basic standard of life 
Based on the verse ”..and in their wealth there is acknowledge right for the needy and 
destitute.” (51:19 Qur’an), this right is the duty of Muslims to economically help those less 
fortunate than themselves. This idea can be found in most religions, Christianity included, but 
does not have a counterpart in the UDHR or the covenants, as it puts the duty on the 
individuals rather than the state to attend to the satisfaction of everybody's basic needs. The 
right to some kind of social security and a minimum economic level can however be found 
both in the UDHR and the ICESCR, but then with the state as duty-bearer.  
 
5.Individual’s right to freedom 
Defined by Mawdudi as the right not to be enslaved, this right to the individual’s freedom is 
equal to article 4 in the UDHR stating that ”No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; 
slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” After declaring slavery as 
condemned already by the Prophet himself, Mawdudi starts a long exposition of the Muslims 
superiority over the West in abolishing slavery. I have often found a similar discussions about 
who abolished slavery first and when both in Islamic and Western literature, as if it was some 
kind of competition. Since slavery undoubtedly is one of the lowest points in our history of 
human rights, but now is theoretically prohibited in all countries both Western and Muslim, I 
however find this discussion lacking interest from any other than an historical perspective. In 
the debate of human rights today, slavery is not an issue where any differences of opinion 
exist.  
 
6.Right to justice 
The right to justice is defined the UDHR and ICCPR as for example the right to a fair trial, 
the right to recognition before the law and the right to protection of the law. Mawdudi’s 
article does not mention any of these rights. The right to justice article in his document only 
states that according to the Qur’an, no Muslim can ever be unjust to anyone, non-
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discriminatory of if they are citizens of their other countries or people of their tribe, race or 
the Muslim community as a whole. This “justice of Islam”, which consequently is extended to 
all human beings is however not further defined, and it is therefore difficult to conclude 
whether it is in coherence with the standards of international law or not. 
 
7.Equality of human beings. 
Discrimination against women and non-Muslim is as mentioned earlier a field where it due to 
rules in the Sharía is hard for the Muslim societies to comply with the Western norms of equal 
rights. By including the right of equality, Mawdudi does however not attempt to clarify that 
area, and the title is somewhat misleading. At various times in the article he states that no 
discrimination based on color, race, language or nationality is allowed in Islam, and that God 
has given man his right of equality as a birthright. Equality based on religion or sex is never 
mentioned. Mayer, in her book “Islam and human rights: Tradition and Politics “ 75 
considers this statement to be empty, as if the US would outlaw discrimination based on caste 
while ignoring to regulate discrimination based on race, which is an actual problem area, or if 
a Hindu environment would do vice versa. Not dealing with the rights of women and religious 
minorities in an Islamic document on human rights is consequently only a hypocritical way of 
allowing these discriminations to continue. 
  
8.The right to cooperate and not cooperate 
Based on the general principle in Islam; “Co-operate with one another for virtue and 
heedfulness and do not co-operate with one another for the purpose of vice and aggression” 
(5:2 Qur’an), this is the right for Muslims to support any activity seen as noble and righteous. 
Even if the person who undertakes the deed isn’t himself a Muslim, the duty to help him 
exists for the pious Muslim. If on the contrary somebody perpetrates deeds of vice and 
aggression, he will not be entitled to support even if he is a Muslim. This right or duty or 
whatever it is to be considered as does not have any counterpart in international law and can 
therefore hardly be subject to comparison.  
 
 
                                                
75 Ann Elisabeth Mayer is an associate professor of legal studies at the Wharton School of the University of 
Pennsylvania. Her book ”Islam and human rights: Tradition and politics”, Westview Press, Oxford 3rd ed. 1999, 
is one of the most acclaimed and well-known studies in the field of Islam and human rights. Both sides in the 
debate on whether human rights and Islamic law are compatible tend to quote her or comment on her opinions, 
which make her book a good start for further reading for the interested.  
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4.3.1.2 The rights of citizens in an Islamic state 
The third chapter of Mawdudi’s document contains the more extended rights of the members 
of an Islamic state. This limitation at once constitutes a problem, since human rights in 
international law are universal and therefore in no situation can be altered to just apply to a 
certain group, such as citizens of a state. I do however not think that the purpose of Mawdudi 
was to establish that Muslims have rights that other people haven't. The rights in the second 
chapter, described above as general human rights, are due to all human beings since they are 
rights and duties imposed on individuals in their behavior amongst each other. The rights that 
Mawdudi introduces in the third chapter are rights that the individual holds against the state. 
The definition of them as rights of the citizens of an Islamic state, is simply made because the 
rules imposed by the Qur’an with the state as a duty-bearer only can be actualized in an 
Islamic state. The rights and duties imposed on individuals in chapter two are to be obeyed by 
all Muslims, even if resident in a non-Islamic state. In the description of almost all rights it is 
stated that the dhimmis (non-Muslim minorities, at least the people of the book) are entitled to 
the same rights as the Muslims if they are citizens of an Islamic state.  
 
The chapter includes fifteen “articles”, or rather expositions on different rights. Most of them 
are somehow related to either the field of freedom of conscience and expression etc., or to the 
field of rights connected to the legal system, such as the right to a fair trial and equality before 
the law. The chapter starts out with the right to security of life and property, which was 
established as the first right also in the chapter of general human rights. In this development 
of the former discussion, Mawdudi clarifies that the general rule that killing another human 
being generally is wrong, but may be allowed due process of law and only after a ruling by a 
legitimate court of law. It is consequently never allowed for a Muslim to kill somebody who 
breaks the rules of the Sharía on his own initiative. The “honor” murders of women guilty of 
adultery by family members are thus only a cruel tradition. The article is also extended to 
include the right of security of property. The general right to the basic necessities of life is 
also repeated in the second chapter, with the difference that the right is held against the state 
and not other individuals.  
 
The rights related to freedom of conscience and expression are complicated by the fact that in 
any document based on a conservative interpretation of the Sharía, problems will arise in the 
field of blasphemy and apostasy. The two articles establishing “Freedom of conscience and 
conviction” and “Protection of religious sentiments” does on one hand emphasize that Islam 
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neither would force anyone to convert to Islam, nor allow any harassment of the “people of 
the book”. It quotes verse 29:46 from the Qur’an; “Do not argue with the people of the Book 
unless it is in the politest manner”. On the other hand there is inevitably going to be a 
limitation in these freedoms when it comes to Muslims wanting to convert to another religion. 
This aspect is however not mentioned in the document, which would indicate that in similarity 
with the rights of women Mawdudi doesn’t seem to acknowledge this as a problem, or intend 
to extend the right of freedom to religion to include conversion from Islam too. In the article 
discussing freedom of expression, the limitations of Islamic rules compared to rules on the 
same subject in international law is easier to trace. The right to freedom of thought and 
expression is conditioned with that it should not be used for “spreading evil and wickedness”. 
According to Mawdudi this makes the concept of freedom of expression superior to its 
western parallel, since it protects the citizens of the Islamic State of being subjected to 
“abusive or offensive language in the name of criticism”. This is however confusing the 
concepts somewhat. Freedom of expression is also in the ICCPR restricted if provided by law 
to respect the rights and reputations of others, and also to protect ordre public among other 
things. I do however not think that what is aimed at in Mawdudi’s article is a limitation of the 
right to protect individuals from being personally offended or defamed, since he establishes 
this “right” in a separate article named “The protection of honor”. The aim is rather to open 
up to the limitations of freedom of expression that the rules of blasphemy and apostasy in the 
Sharía bring about. Statements later in the article, such as the obligation of all true Muslims to 
forbid people to adopt the paths of evil, also indicates that speaking ill of the prophet or 
criticizing Islam would not be accepted under the freedom of expression in an Islamic state, 
even though there is no concrete definition of "evil or wickedness" in any of the articles. This 
assumption can however be made since both Mawdudi and his organization are known to 
have a rather fundamentalist view of Islam, even supporting death penalty for conversion 
from Islam.76 The article on freedom of association includes similar limitations. It conditions 
the right to form parties and organizations with that it can’t be for the purpose of spreading 
evil and mischief. The corresponding right in the ICCPR also includes the possibility to limit 
this right. These limitations can be imposed by law, if it is in the interest of national security, 
public safety, ordre public, protection of public health or morals or the protection of rights and 
freedoms of others. One can of course play with the thought that also these somewhat vague 
definitions, especially “public morals”, can be interpreted rather extensively. This could leave 
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plenty of room for limitation in the freedom of association (and also freedom of expression) to 
criteria we in the Western world consider disturbing for morals, but maybe in other cultures 
would seem unmotivated. 
 
The rest of the articles are in some way related to the legal or judicial system. As mentioned 
earlier most countries in the Islamic world have both secular and religious courts. The 
religious courts are regulating mainly family-matters, such as divorces and heritage. One of 
the subjects discussed by Mawdudi is “Equality before the law”. He rightly points out that 
Islam doesn’t discriminate on base of class, and therefore all men are equal before the law as 
they are equal in all other aspects of society. He also emphasizes that dhimmis have the same 
rights as Muslims. This might be true, but when it comes to the religious courts, especially in 
the countries as Iran where no secular courts exists, non-Muslims also have to live after rules 
that are set by a religion the don’t even adhere to. Even if the laws may be applied to them 
equally, the thought of having your daily life totally governed by a God you may not even 
believe in, might be disturbing in many situations. One concrete example to illustrate this is 
the situation of the non-Muslim women in Iran. They are forced to obey the hijab- rules, 
enforcing major restrictions in how they are allowed to dress, despite the fact that for them 
there obviously isn’t any religious motivation or believed “divine” reward for doing so. 
 
 The remaining articles are more or less compatible with international law, like the right to 
security of personal freedom and the security of private life. Some articles are without a 
counterpart in international rules but not opposed to them, and will be left outside the 
discussion. It is however interesting to note that the last article in Mawdudi’s chapter three on 
the rights of the citizens in an Islamic state is “The right to participate in the affairs of the 
state”. In this article Mawdudi establish that the Qur’an gives the Muslims in an Islamic state 
the right to elect their government and representatives through free and independent elections. 
Whether democracy is compatible with Islam or not is an issue often debated, especially since 
many of the states considered Islamic does not have a democratic rule. Still, Mawdudi’s 
document is actually the only one of the Islamic human rights documents referred to here that 
mentions the right to representative democracy.  
  
Mawdudi’s document has obvious shortcomings in reaching up to the standards of 
international human rights, such as set in the UN documents. Unlike the next three documents 
I will describe, one must however remember that this document is not an official one. The 
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purpose is not trying to compromise with international law or establish an alternative set of 
rights based in the idea of cultural relativity. It is simply a conservative Muslim’s description 
of what rights are included in the Qur’an and Sharía. The document can however be seen as 
authoritative doctrine, and are relevant as a guideline for many Muslims. The document 
avoids many sensitive questions, and the fields in which the Sharía is hard to adjust to 
international law are often carefully avoided. 
 
4.3.2 The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR)77 
The UIDHR was promulgated in 1981 at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris. The document 
was prepared by representatives from Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, and other countries in 
the Islamic Council, a London based organization affiliated with the Muslim World League, 
an international NGO with its headquarters in Saudi-Arabia. According to some, it has, as 
mentioned earlier, a tendency to represent the interests of conservative Muslims.78 The 
declaration exists in two versions, one in English and one in Arabic, and there is a significant 
difference between the two versions79. According to Mayer, the English version, at least at a 
first brief viewing, appears to be more in compliance with the UDHR, while the one in Arabic 
is relying much more on Sharía to justify rights. But also in the English version one can read 
in the explanatory notes: 
 
” In the exercise and enjoyment of the rights referred to above every person should 
be subject only to such limitations as are enjoined by the Law for the purpose 
securing the due recognition of, and respect for, the rights and freedom of others and 
of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and general welfare of the 
Community (Ummah)” 
 
It is also stated in the explanatory notes that by the Law, the text refers to the Sharía – defined 
as the totality of ordinances derived from the Qur’an and Sunna, and any other laws that are 
deduced from these two sources by methods considered valid in Islamic jurisprudence. This is 
of course from our point of view strongly limiting the human rights such as they are described 
in the UDHR. Since the standards of what is defined as Sharía are left relatively open, it 
                                                
77 Tabet Koraytem calls this same declaration The Islamic Universal Declaration of Human Rights (IUDHR), so 
I’m not sure about the correct term. I will however continuously use Mayer’s. 
78 Mayer, p21 
79 Mayer p21 and Tabet Koraytem , Arab Islamic Development on Human Rights, Arab Law Quarterly 2001, 
p260 
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leaves the possibility for different interpretations and applications. Consequently it is almost 
impossible to predict what restrictions might occur. 
 
A clearly theocratic approach is taken already in the foreword of the declaration, where it is 
stated that all human rights are given by God, and God only since he is omnipotent. Since 
these rules are divine they are sufficient in protecting the community, and no ruler or 
government can violate or change them. Accordingly, all the articles in the declaration have 
an explicit reference to certain verses of the Qur’an or specific parts of the Hadith. Another 
difference from most Western human rights documents is the existence of a corresponding 
duty to many of the rights in the declaration. For example in article XII, it is stated to be the 
”right and duty of every Muslim to protest and strive (within the limits set out by the Law) 
against oppression..” . Article IV, one of the paragraphs on Right to Justice, in a similar way 
contains the duties to defend rights of other persons and the community, protest against 
injustice and refuse to obey any command which is contrary to the Law. This is a divergence 
from the UDHR and other international declarations on human rights, which focuses almost 
only on rights and rarely mentions corresponding duties. There are further rights included in 
the UIDHR that are not directed against the state, but has another individual as opponent, 
indirectly creating a duty for that individual. Examples of this are the rules in articles XIX and 
XX, regulating family matters and the rights of the married woman, which obliges the 
husband to maintain his wife and children, and entitles the wife to special respect, care and 
assistance from the family in times of motherhood. This might seem a bit odd from our 
Western view of human rights, since we only define human rights as rights we have in 
relation to the state or other authorities. In a document referring to the Islamic law this is 
however not that strange, regarding that that whole system is based on a worldview where the 
individual is part of a bigger community (the Ummah). To achieve the ideal community, the 
individuals have to fulfill certain duties against God and the Ummah, but they also have God-
given rights. 
The declaration remains, at least in the English version80, relatively neutral in ”sensitive” 
questions such as women’s rights, the rights of minorities and freedom of belief. None of 
these issues are openly confronted. But also in this version one can easily read between the 
lines that the protection of these rights is not sufficient, if compared to the standards set in the 
                                                
80 According to Mayer, p 106-113, the Arabic version is more clear in for example the field of women’s rights. 
Since I’m lacking the ability to read the Arabic text I can only refer to the English version in analyzing the 
declaration. 
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universal declarations. In article XII Right to Freedom of belief, Thought and Speech, 
paragraph a), the right for every person to ”express his thoughts and beliefs as long as he 
remains within the limits prescribed by the Law”, is established. Keeping in mind that the 
Law is defined as the Sharia, an obvious problem on how to deal with the Islamic rules on 
apostasy arises. At a minimum, a system based on the Sharia will probably prohibit trying to 
convert people to a different faith than Islam, and to speak disparagingly of the Prophet. This 
would be a restriction in the freedom of expression, incompatible with the international 
standards of human right.  
 
The Sharía, according to orthodox interpretations, prohibits conversion from Islam. In many 
of the countries considered Islamic, it is also illegal or at least a problem when it comes to 
civil status81 to convert from Islam (obviously conversion from another religion to Islam is 
rather encouraged). This also applies to all forms of apostasy.  If using these kinds of 
interpretations of Sharía, the freedom of religion is also strongly limited. There is however 
also an article (XIII), stating that ”Every person has the right to freedom of conscience and 
worship in accordance with his religious beliefs.” This article does not mention ”the Law” in 
its wording, but in the references of the declaration it refers as all the other articles to a 
paragraph in the Qur’an. As I see it there is nothing in the Qur’an prohibiting the practice of 
other religions. Islam is even explicitly tolerant to the ”people of the book” (ahl al-kitab), the 
Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians, who are allowed to freedom of worship and security of 
person and property, as long as they pay a poll tax (jizya). But in some aspects they hold the 
statues of second-class citizens in an Islamic state, and it is questionable whether it is to be 
seen as freedom of religion, as we define it.82 The non-Muslim minorities are dealt with in 
article X, according to which their rights are governed by the Qur’anic principle”There is no 
compulsion in religion”, based on the Qur’an 2:256. The traditional interpretation of this verse 
focuses on the right of the dhimmis (non-Muslims) not to be forced to convert to Islam, rather 
than on their right not to be discriminated against based on their religion. In the English 
version of the article, the term non-Muslims seems to be referring to all other religions, but in 
the Arabic version the term ahl al-kitab (people of the book) is used instead of non-Muslims. 
                                                
81 For example, according to Sharia, if one of the spouses in a marriage converts, which incurs civil death 
(meaning among other things that a person can’t be legally married or inherit), the marriage is automatically 
dissolved. This happened to the Egyptian professor Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, who in 1994-96 was accused of 
apostasy and got the marriage to his Muslim wife dissolved. The couple eventually had to seek asylum in Europe 
to be able to live together without the threat of getting killed. (Mayer p152) 
82 Dalacoura, p 46 
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This leaves the statues of other religious minorities, who in pre-modern Sharia were 
considered non-persons, unregulated. 
The protection of the rights related to freedom of religion and rights of minorities is obviously 
one of the more complicated questions to regulate in a human rights declaration based on a 
religious system of rules such as the Sharía. In the UIDHR, the protection in parts seem to be 
sufficient, but if interpreted according with the references to the Sharía it is uncertain whether 
it is possible to reach a level that would be considered equivalent to the UDHR.  
 
 In the UIDHR the rights of women aren’t specifically treated, possibly avoided because of 
the ambivalence towards the subject. The position of the women still turns up in the articles 
XIX Right to Found a Family and Related Matters, and XX Rights of Married Women.  
The right to get married is an unqualified right in the UDHR, meaning that a person is free to 
marry anyone he or she finds suitable (art 16.1 ”Men and women of full age, without any 
limitations due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and found a family”). In 
the UIDHR, the corresponding article (XIX .a) has a slightly different wording: ”Every person 
is entitled to marry, to found a family and to bring up children in conformity with his religion, 
traditions and cultures.” The phrase ”in conformity with his religion”, supposedly read as 
according to Sharía, will on contrary to the international rule impose restrictions on the right 
to get married. The Sharía does for example prohibit women to marry non-Muslims, and men 
are only allowed to marry a woman who’s either Muslim or member of the ”people of the 
book”. It is also prohibited, as mentioned earlier, to marry or stay married to an apostate. 
The article XIX a) further states that every spouse in a marriage is ”entitled to such rights and 
privileges and carries such obligations that are stipulated by the Law”. With a very 
fundamentalist reading of the Qur’an, as for example that of the Talibans where the women’s 
rights are strongly limited, the article does not prevent an unequal treatment of women, at 
least not within the marriage. The rights of the unmarried woman are not at all discussed in 
the declaration. But since all of the articles that appear to refer to all persons, have references 
to Sharía, and women in most interpretations of Islam has an inferior position to men, one 
might doubt that un-married women would have more extended rights than their married 
counterparts. Getting married is also normally considered the only acceptable path to choose 
for a respectable woman, and before marriage she is under the guardianship of her father, or 
another male relative. Interesting to note is also that one of the verses in the Qura’n referred to 
in connection with art XIX (and according to Mayer incorporated in the text in the Arabic 
version of the declaration), is verse 2:228. This verse is often, as mentioned earlier, used by 
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conservatives to confirm that Islam mandates male superiority. Another fact revealing that the 
equality between men and women is not according to the standards of the international human 
rights documents, although there is nothing directly pointing this out in the UIDHR, is the 
mere existence of an article regulating the rights of married women.  In a society where the 
rights of men and women are equal, whether they are married or not, there would not be a 
need for a special regulation of the status of the married woman. The married woman is 
according to the article entitle to for example living in the house in which her husband lives, 
and receiving means necessary for maintaining a standard of living not inferior to that of her 
spouse. These are of course not negative rights, since they protect women from being 
economically mistreated within the marriage. If women were not seen as inferior to start with, 
and the husband considered the only or at least main provider of the family, there would on 
the other hand not be a need for rules that protected her and not simply the spouse less well of 
financially. The references to article XX include the verse 4:34 of the Qur’an, which also is 
cited in the Arabic version83. It includes the obligation for the husband to provide for his wife, 
similar to the English version, but makes the connection that this is the reason why man are in 
control of woman. Other rights of the married woman mentioned in the article, are the right to 
obtain dissolution of marriage and to inherit from her husband and other relatives – both in 
accordance with the Law.  Divorce is however harder for women to obtain than it is for men. 
Due to Sharía it is almost impossible without the consent of the husband, and the rules on 
heritage in Sharía allows women only half the share of a male. Furthermore a widow can 
inherit, as a maximum, a quarter of her husband estate if there are no children, and one-
eighths if there are (Qura’n 4:12). If the husband has more than one wife, since the Qur’an 
allows up to four wives, the share consequently gets even smaller. These rights are 
consequently rather restrictions than extended rights. When it comes to the rights of women, 
the conclusion will have to be that, even if the subject a first glance might seem to be 
carefully avoided in the UIDHR, the situation of women is supposed to be regulated mainly 
according to principles in the Sharía. As pointed out earlier this leads to a very unpredictable 
application of the law, dependent on what interpretation of the Sharía the Islamic state that 
potentially ratifies the declaration chooses. Our western standards of equality between the 
genders will however be difficult to reach up to, even with a less conservative school of 
interpretation, since the idea that men and women have different roles in society has such a 
firm base both in tradition and in the Islamic religion. One article that further is worth 
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mentioning is article XIX e), according to which no person may be forced into a marriage or 
loose or suffer diminution of legal personality on account of marriage. This is one of the few 
articles that might be seen as an exception to the rule that all articles are strictly Sharía based. 
The Maliki School, for example, allowed a girl’s guardian to marry her of without her 
consent. Marriages without the consent of the woman is still an existing problem in many 
Muslim societies, although it is outlawed in most Middle East countries. It is therefore 
promising to see this issue addressed in a declaration produced by an organization considered 
conservative.  
 
The UIDHR is a good example of a human rights declaration based on a theocentric 
foundation of values. Already in the preamble it is made very clear that the declaration and 
the rights in it have a religious focus, and although it does make an effort to measure up to the 
international standards, it will not work in the same manner as a secular human rights 
document. This would on the other hand probably apply to most human rights documents 
with a religious base. Few religions are as focused on individual rights as the enlightenment 
philosophies inspiring the western human rights ideas are. 
 
 
4.3.3 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 1990 
The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, in both an English and an Arabic version, 
were submitted to the UN by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) prior to the 
World Conference on Human rights in Vienna in 199384. The central preoccupation of the 
conference itself was the matter of whether human rights are linked to Western culture and 
values, or if they should and could be universal. Strong voices where raised for more 
consideration of cultural differences – cultural relativism, especially from non-western 
countries. At one point Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq joined together in pressing the UN 
Commission on Human Rights to accept the Cairo Declaration as an alternative for the 
Muslim countries. The existing human rights system is according to them excessively 
Western and leaves no room for other cultural and religious values. This view was however 
rejected by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who insisted on the universality of human 
rights85. The Cairo declaration is important for two reasons, even though the UN hasn't 
accepted it. It is one of the more recent documents of its kind, but it clearly continues the 
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trend earlier established in previous Islamic human right schemes. It was also endorsed by the 
foreign ministers of the OIC in August 1990. The OIC consists of all countries considering 
themselves Islamic and the document can therefore be seen as some form of political 
consensus on human rights from the perspective of the Muslims states, even though they don’t 
exactly have a common stand on the application of Sharía.  
 
Since this declaration is more of an official governmental document, compared to the 
conservative UIDHR, it tones down the references to Sharía. There is however no doubt that 
also the Cairo declaration has a religious foundation. The declaration is a mix of political and 
socioeconomic rights, and similar to the UIDHR it includes rights that have corresponding 
duties addressed to other individuals and not the state. It begins with a preamble recognizing 
the importance of having an Islamic human rights document that will serve as a general 
guidance on human rights matters in the Islamic states. It also inclines that all rights are of 
divine source and establishes that: 
 
”..fundamental rights and freedoms according to Islam are an integral part of the 
Islamic religion and that no one shall have the right as a matter of principle to 
abolish them either in the whole or in part or to violate or ignore them in as much as 
they are binding divine commands, which are contained in the Revealed Books of 
Allah and which are sent through the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding 
divine messages..” 
 
When it comes to the groups that traditionally have a weaker position in an Islamic state, such 
as women and non-Muslims, their position is not openly confronted in this declaration either. 
Article 1 a) talks about all men being equal in terms of basic human “..dignity, and basic 
obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations”. It 
does however not mention that there would be rights that are equal to all individuals. One 
might think that this is only a rhetorical difference, but it does leave room for interpretations 
where equal dignity for example between men and women doesn’t necessarily lead to the 
same set of basic rights. The article does neither constitute a sufficient protection of freedom 
of religion. It prohibits discrimination on basis of religion, at least as far as “dignity” is 
concerned, but it refers to the ”true religion”( Islam), as the guarantee to enhancing it. This 
might lead back to the apostasy rules of the Sharía.  In 1 b) it is also made clear that all human 
beings are Allah’s subjects, and no one has superiority over another “except on the basis of 
 48 
piety”. The wording is somewhat vague, but it seems like the article wouldn’t be enough to 
protect for example a person accused of apostasy. There are two more articles concerning 
religion, article 18, establishing a right for the individual to live in security ”for himself, his 
religion, his dependents, his honor and his property”, and article 10 that prohibits pressuring 
people to convert from Islam, or to atheism. Article 10 is clearly a restriction in the freedom 
of religion and not a right. Article 18 does however suggest a certain standard of protection of 
religious minorities and freedom of religion. But reading for example article 23 b), in which 
the right to assume office is regulated according to Sharía (which means excluding the 
possibility for non-Muslims to assume public office) it once again appear to be an empty 
statement. It might be religious tolerance, allowing everybody to practice their own religion, 
rather than religious freedom, where a persons religion would not lead to any restriction of his 
other rights. 
 
Many rights in the UDHR are unqualified, like the right to life and security (art 3), and the 
right not to be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (art 
4). In the Cairo declaration these rights exist, but with the difference that they can be put aside 
for reasons prescribed in the Sharía. (Art 2a and 2d). This leaves room for the pre-modern 
Sharía rules on the so called Húdud-crimes, the crimes against which God himself has set 
limits, and for which the punishment is directly formulated in the Qur’an. This includes for 
example the physical punishments for theft and adultery, often discussed in western media as 
inhuman and uncivilized. Theft is in verse 5:36(41) punished by cutting of the hands of the 
thief. The following verse does however make an exception for the criminal who repents his 
crime. Adultery is punished by death for women, if the betrayed husband can find four 
witnesses whom actually seen the act of adultery (4:15-16). There is also another verse 
regulating adultery (24:2), where flogging is the punishment men and women equally. This 
rule does not call for witnesses. The húdud punishments are a controversy also in Islamic 
states, and many reformist consider them a remnant from an Islam not adjusted to modern 
society. Fundamentalists often consider them laws given by God and therefore not a matter of 
compromise. Whatever one thinks about the existence of crimes sanctioned by God, there is 
however no doubt that if physical penalties such as flogging, cutting of hands or death 
penalties are carried out in the name of Sharía, it is not compatible with the UDHR’s articles 3 
and 4.  
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The rights of women are vaguely discussed in article 6. Women are said to be equal to man in 
“..human dignity, and has her own rights to enjoy as well as duties to perform”, but no 
definition is made about what these rights and duties are. Since the article makes no reference 
to Sharía, the interpretation of it is even harder. The formulation that women are equal to men 
in dignity, but has her own in rights, does however give an indication that all other rights in 
the declaration does not automatically apply to women too. The duty of the husband to 
provide for the family is also established in this article. This further indicates a conservative 
way of seeing the man as the provider, and his superiority over the woman is thereby probably 
presumed. There are also other relevant articles, such as freedom of movement and right to 
public office, which refer to rules in the Sharía. With a conservative interpretation this would 
lead to restrictions for women. Due to some traditions, women are not allowed to travel 
without the company of a male relative. The right to marry, in art 5, is restricted in a similar 
way as the corresponding article in the UIDHR. It establishes that the right to marry shall 
have no restrictions stemming from race, color or nationality. It leaves out religion, 
consequently leaving room for an application of the Sharía rules prohibiting women to marry 
a non-Muslim, and the other restrictions mentioned earlier.  
One interesting article dealing with equality is art 13, which states the right to fair wages for 
work, “without any discrimination between males and females”. According to Mayer, the 
somewhat vague formulations in the same article; “everyone shall be free to chose the 
 work that suits him best and serves his interest as well as those of the society” and ”he may 
not be assigned work beyond his capacity”, might on the other hand lead to women being 
excluded from certain fields of work .86 
Article 22 deals with freedom of expression. The freedom of expression can hardly be 
interpreted as anything else but strongly restricted due to this article. Everyone has the right to 
express his or her opinion freely, as long as it isn’t contrary to the Sharía. This brings us back 
to the problem with apostasy. In art 22 c) there is another, maybe even wider restriction to 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press. It establishes that information is a vital 
necessity to society, but then names a variety of restrictions to this such as information 
violating the sanctities or the dignity of the Prophet, undermining moral and ethical values 
and disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weakens its faith. In an Islamic state those would 
be pretty strong restrictions for example for non-Muslim media. The freedom of expression is 
however not unrestricted in the ICCPR either. It can be subject to certain restrictions if it is 
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provided by law, and necessary for the respect of the rights and reputations of others and the 
protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals (art 19). To be 
fair I guess one can say that at least the “public morals”-exception is as arbitrary as the ones 
in 22c of the Cairo declaration.  
 
The last two articles of the declaration make one last connection between the declaration and 
the Sharía. They stipulate that all rights in the declaration are subject to the Islamic Sharía and 
that the Sharía is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any of the 
articles. The consequence of this is that the Cairo declaration, even without any exact 
references to the Qur’an and Hadith as those of the UIDHR, has the same problem with 
predictability as the former document. The possibility that different schools of interpretation 
of the Sharía can be used to set the limits of the rights stated in the articles, leaves a wide 
spectrum of possible applications, of which the most extreme without a doubt falls outside the 
international human rights standard.  Although I have not mentioned the articles in conformity 
with the international human right rules, but only high-lighted the fields in which the 
declaration does not measure up to international standards, it seems clear that the Cairo 
Declaration in resemblance with the UIDHR does not reach up to the western idea of 
universal human rights. 
 
 
4.3.4 Arab Charter of Human Rights 1994   
The Arab Charter of Human Rights is a document produced by the Arab League. The Arab 
League was founded in 1945, but before1968 non-of the members showed any interest in 
human rights, and the charter was not adopted until 199487. The first draft was however 
prepared already in 1970, by a committee of experts established by the permanent Arab 
Commission. Due to lack of interest from many of the member states, and many reservations 
from those who cared to answer to the draft, it was discarded. In 1979 the idea was 
rejuvenated at a seminar convened by the Union of Jurists in Baghdad, where a new draft was 
produced. The draft was considered by the Council of the League, which decided in March 
1983 to refer it to the member states for their view. After that the matter was postponed again, 
pending the adoption of the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights. The latter was adopted by 
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the Islamic Ministerial Conference in Cairo in 1990. The Council of the Arab League adopted 
the Arab Human Rights Charter by Resolution 5437 of 15 September 1994. The Charter has 
not been ratified by any of the Arab states since the adoption of the League88. 
The Arab Charter on Human Rights is very different from the former two mentioned 
declarations (the UIDHR and The Cairo Declaration). The most obvious difference is that no 
reference to the Sharía is made in any of the articles. It is stated in the preamble that the 
eternal principles of brotherhood and equality among all human beings are established in the 
Islamic Sharía and the other divinely revealed religions, but apart from that Sharía is not at all 
mentioned. The preamble also reaffirms the principles of the UN Charter, The UDHR, the 
ICCPR and the ICESCR. This kind of reference to international documents can not be found 
in any of the other Islamic human rights documents. The Arab Charter does however also 
reaffirm the principles of the Cairo Declaration, which as I concluded earlier aren’t always in 
agreement with those of the UN documents. The Arab Charter also stands out from the earlier 
mentioned documents in the way its articles are formulated. Most of the articles are cited, or 
at least close to the wording of a corresponding article in the UDHR, the ICCPR or the 
ICESCR. The initial article in the UDHR, establishing that all human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights, and that they are endowed with reason and conscience, is however 
not to be found in the Arab Charter. Instead it starts out with an article declaring the self-
determination of peoples and condemning racism, Zionism, occupation and foreign 
domination (the self-determination part is close in the wording of the initial article of the 
UCCPR). As I see it, this discrepancy from the UDHR has both historical and political 
reasons. The reason and rationality of man is an idea of the Enlightenment, and as mentioned 
earlier and this is hard to combine with a non-secularized world-view, where all rights are 
given by an almighty God. The statement condemning occupation, Zionism and so on are 
obviously a consequence of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, and the incomprehensible way the 
situation is handled by the Western states, and mainly the US. The fear in the Middle-East of 
what they call a re-colonization is also strong among certain groups, and although the Arab 
Charter is drawn up years before the US lead wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, beginning the 
declaration with this article might not be unmotivated.   
 
Article 3 prohibits denial of fundamental rights of the member states, by virtue of 
international treaties and customs. Article 4 does on the other hand leave room for restrictions 
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to rights under the Charter if imposed by law and deemed necessary to protect ”..national 
security and economy, public order, health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”  
According to An-Naim, this is a vague exception opens the door for legislation that can 
undermine the rights of the Charter.89 This is true; however there is an almost identical 
exception in the UDHR art 29. The only difference between the articles is that the one in the 
UDHR adds that these exceptions only can be made in a democratic society. Exceptions made 
on the basis of the Sharía, if that is the official law of a country, stating for example different 
rights for women and motivating this with the necessity of keeping the moral standard 
concerning family unchanged, would be possible according to both of the declarations. The 
UDHR would however only permit the exception in the case a democratic government had 
made the law. This is not a too unlikely course of events. The movements of politic Islam are 
growing much stronger in the Middle East, especially now in times when the segregation 
between East and West is increasing. The possibility of a democratically elected Islamic 
government is no longer far-fetched (in Turkey there has for example already been Islamists 
in the government, although they after a coup had to leave it).  
 
Although most of the remaining articles are more or less in compliance with the rules in the 
UDHR or the two covenants, apart from minor differences in formulation, there are still a 
possible discrepancy in the rules concerning freedom of religion and freedom of opinion. The 
freedom of belief, thought and opinion is stated in article 26 and the freedom of religion in 
article 27. Article 27 contains a paragraph putting a possibly extensive exception to these 
freedoms, establishing that:  ”..No restriction shall be imposed on the exercise of freedom of 
belief, thought and opinion except as provided by law” 
It is consequently possible for a state with Sharía based laws, to keep rules prohibiting 
apostasy. Since the exception does not require the protection of another interest, such as moral 
or public security, it makes it easy to restrict any of these freedoms for a government, 
irrespective of whether it is democratic or not. The rules on apostasy make it, among other 
things, impossible for a Muslim to convert to another religion. This constitutes a breach of the 
article 18 of the UDHR, in which the right of everyone to change religion or belief is clearly 
stated. The right to marry, which as we’ve seen earlier often constitutes a problem in Islamic 
human rights schemes since the right to marry does not include marrying a person of any 
religion, is for some reason not regulated in the Arab Charter. Unlike the UIDHR and the 
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Cairo Declaration, the Arab Charter contains no article specifically regulating the rights of 
women. Article 2 clearly states that all individuals have the same rights without distinction to 
sex. The rights of women are never mentioned as a different set of rights.90 The Arab Charter 
seems to be the only of the Islamic documents where women’s rights, at least in theory, are 
equal to those of men. 
 
Religious minorities, which as mentioned earlier aren’t always treated equal according to 
Islamic rules, have an article expressly protecting their rights. But article 37 only protects the 
right for minorities to not be deprived of their right to enjoy their culture or to follow the 
teachings of their religion.  The corresponding article in the ICCPR is similar in its wording, 
but the expression  ”profess and practice their own religion” (ICCPR art 27) is however 
slightly more extensive than to ”follow the teachings of their religion” (art 37). There is, as I 
see it, nothing in the Charter preventing the application of the Sharía rules regarding the 
special poll tax for religious minorities. The articles regulating who is allowed to seek public 
office, a right that in the former two mentioned documents could be limited by rules in the 
Sharía, is unlimited in article 33 of the Arab Charter. This is an improvement of the rights of 
the religious minorities. An-Naim claims in his article ”Human Rights in the Arab World – A 
Regional Perspective”, that the Charter fails to provide for the right to political organization 
and participation.  His point might be right, as he refers to the earlier mentioned possibilities 
to restrict any of the rights in the Charter (art 4). There is on the other an almost identical right 
to freedom of peaceful assembly and association in article 28, as that of the UDHR, which as I 
see it demonstrates a will to acknowledge this as a right of importance. The right to form trade 
unions and to strike are also mentioned, which is a step in the right direction in many Arab 
countries where striking never has been a right provided by law. A deficiency that I find more 
disturbing in the Arab Charter, as far as political organization goes, is that no article or part of 
the preamble indicates that the political system of the State parties of the Charter should be 
democratic and based on the will of the people. In the UDHR, for example article 21:3 
establishes the right for everybody to elect their own government through periodic and 
genuine elections, with equal and universal suffrage. In the Arab Charter, the rights at many 
times measure up to international standards, but as far as democratic values goes that is 
carefully avoided in its articles. This is perhaps not surprising considering the number of Arab 
States that still are far from what we would consider democracies.  
                                                
90 Except that you can’t inflict death penalty on a pregnant woman and that the state should provide for special 
care for mothers and children. Both of these are however taken from the International HR documents. 
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The Arab Charter also has a system of implementation included in articles 40-41. It is 
however a weak system based on the foundation of a human rights committee with seven 
members elected by the members State Parties. The member states have a duty submit a 
report to the committee every third year. They should furthermore give answers to the 
questions asked by the Committee. The committee shall after that report their views and 
comments to the Permanent Commission of Human Rights of the Arab League. The idea of 
having any rules on implementation is an improvement in comparison to the other Islamic 
documents, but it is a rather weak system. In comparison with for example the African 
Charter, which often is criticized for having a system where the individuals possibility to raise 
a complaint is formulated in a rather imprecise way91, the Arab Charter leaves the question of 
any communication between other parties than states and the committees completely 
unregulated. 
 
Compared to the UIDHR and the Cairo Declaration, the Arab Charter of Human Rights is far 
more adjusted to the international human rights standards of the UDHR and the two 
Covenants. No direct references are made to the Sharía. Nothing in the articles indicates that a 
theocratic value forms the moral foundation of the declaration. But the Charter still lacks 
some components that would make it a fully equal alternative to the UN documents. It is also 
worth mentioning again, that the Arab Charter has not yet been ratified by the states of the 
Arab League, and therefore it has no legal significance. 
  
  
5. Regional Human Rights development in practice 
 
5.1 Limitation  
I will in this chapter try to give a more practical aspect of the human rights development in 
Islamic countries, by describing how the adaptation of international human rights documents 
have been handled by the governments and the existence of governmental human rights 
activities. I will also further describe the situation of the local human rights NGOs, and last 
briefly discuss whether there is any human rights discourse within the sphere of political 
Islam. To narrow things down a little, I have chosen to focus on the human rights 
                                                
91 International Human Rights in Context,  edited Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, second edition 2000, 
Oxford Press, Oxford p 924 ( from Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, ”The individual complaints procedure of the African 
Commission of Human and People’s Rights: A preliminary Assessment” 1998    
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development in the Arab countries. Studying all the countries in the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (being all the countries that define themselves as Islamic countries in the 
world) would be far too extensive. Since it is difficult to find a general definition of which 
states are ”Arab” states, I will in this chapter use this term meaning the member states of the 
Arab League92. The choice of the Arab countries as a criterion seems natural, since it was in 
that part of the world Islam first appeared and still today this is where you find the states with 
the highest percentage of Muslims. In these countries, religion has a very strong influence on 
politics. The member states of the Arab League are however very diverse, and the Charter of 
the Arab League does not define what is an ”Arab state”. The decision of who’s allowed to 
join is simply made by the pre-existing members. Some members, such as Somalia and 
Djibouti, do not have an Arabic speaking population and does hardly belong to the sphere of 
Arabic culture. The states are also very diverse in size, and among the members are some of 
the poorest countries of the world (Somalia, Sudan and Mauritania), and some of the richest 
(Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirate). Islam is seen as a major factor of unity between 
them, but the way it is understood and practiced, and also the degrees of secularization, vary. 
To use these states as a base of comparison might therefore seem like a too wide 
generalization. However, the problems that arise around the implementation and coercion 
between Islam and the international human rights, are basically the same in most of the 
member states. The degree of development may of course vary from state to state, and also 
from time to time depending on what political branch is in power. For this reason I think it is 
possible to use the common terminology Arab States, when analyzing the fields of 
governmental action and human rights organizations in Muslim countries.  
 
 
5.2 Development on the governmental level 
 
5.2.1 Commitment to the International documents on Human Right 
 
The first indications of an interest in the protection of human rights, both at a governmental 
and an intergovernmental level in the Arab states, can be traced back to the 1970s. This is 
probably due to mainly three factors.93  In the seventies the UN started to intensify its effort to 
                                                
92 The Arab League was first established in 1945 and the present membership of the League is: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.  
 
93 An-Na’im Abdullahi A, Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional Perspective,  Human Rights Quarterly 
23 (2001) p 708 
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pursue member states to ratify the two International Human Rights Covenants of 1966. The 
coming into force of these two documents also made it clear that human rights were now 
considered a matter of international concern. There was also, most importantly, a mounting 
appreciation for democratization and human rights protection within Arab societies during 
this decade. The first Arab states to ratify the two Covenants were Syria and Tunisia in 1969, 
closely followed by Libya in 1970 and Iraq in 1971. By 1999 nine more states had ratified the 
Covenants (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen). 
In 2003 Djibouti ratified. It is still worth noting that more than a third of the member states 
have not ratified any basic human right treaties at all. The CEDAW and the Convention 
against Torture has each been ratified by eleven states, mostly the same as those who ratified 
the two Covenants94  
There is however, even among the states who actually have a good record of ratifying, a 
resistance to comply with the requirements of international supervision and accountability. 
The Optional Protocol for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that makes 
it possible for individuals to make complaints for violations of their human rights, has only 
been ratified by three Arab states (Algeria, Libya and Somalia). Many of the states that have 
ratified CEDAW have also done that with reservation in such crucial parts that it tends to 
undermine the whole idea of the convention. This is to be fair not a problem only in the Arab 
states. Other states, for example the US, have made reservations to several conventions. 
Among those states that have ratified the major treaties, there has been very little change in 
the national legislation to achieve their international obligations. Problems with getting these 
states to submit their periodic reports under the treaties in time have also occurred. The 
ambivalence among governments in the region to human rights is also reflected in the 
treatment of human rights NGOs, whose members often are harassed and their activities 
undermined or even prohibited.  
 
5.2.2 Governmental ”human rights departments”  
 Another development in the Arab World is the governmental creation of different forms of 
human rights departments, ministries or councils, all to at least appear to be committed to 
their international human rights obligations. Morocco did for example establish ”the Advisory 
Council for Human Rights” in 1990, and also appointed a minister for human rights. Algeria 
                                                
94 CEDAW:  Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen. 
The Convention Against Torture: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
Somalia, Tunisia and Yemen.  
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appointed a human rights minister in 1991, but the position was abolished again in 1992 and 
replaced by a governmental agency ”The National Monitor of Human Rights”. Tunisia has 
several human rights departments in addition to other ministries, such as Foreign Affairs, 
Interior, Justice and Social Affairs. 
Different forms of human rights departments or councils are also found in Egypt, Lebanon, 
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait and Yemen.95 
 
5.2.3 “Governmental” human rights NGOs 
A common response to international criticism of the situation of human rights organizations in 
the Arab world, has been for governments to be involved in creating or controlling their own 
human right NGOs. 
The first organization of this kind was the “Iraqi Human Rights Organization”, founded in 
1970 to promote the views of the governing Bath-party. In 1975 the “Egyptian Human Rights 
Organization”, was established by people closely associated to President Sadat, leading to 
serious doubts about its credibility. In Tunisia the tension between the government and the 
independent NGO Tunisian League for Human Rights led to the establishment of another 
organization, “The Tunisian Society for Human Rights and Public Freedoms”, on initiative of 
the government in 1987. One government that took it even further was that of Sudan, who not 
only banned the Sudan Human Rights Organization, but also replaced with its own 
organization with the same name.96 These organizations are not automatically “bad” 
organizations, but it of course affects the impartiality of an organization if it is tied to the 
government it is supposed to supervise. 
 
 
5.3 The local Human Rights movements in the Arab countries 
Besides the development made on a governmental level, the Arab countries have as most 
other countries, active NGOs that are very important in monitoring the situation and putting 
pressure on the establishment. When dealing with human rights in third world countries, and 
specifically the Arab countries, one can however easily get the impression that all work for 
implementation and supervising is made by western states, the UN or westerly based human 
rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The existence 
and importance of local human rights organizations and other NGOs is rarely mentioned. 
                                                
95 An-Na’im, p 711 
96 An-Naim p 711 
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There do however exist at least fifty local and regional organizations in the Arab countries. 
The importance of these, especially in the work of spreading the ideas of human rights among 
the people of their countries, should not be underestimated97. But the Muslim human rights 
organizations suffer from several problems of both internal and external nature. 
One common perception is that governments of developing countries are more responsive to 
international pressure, than to pressure from local NGOs. This leads to a tendency of 
international human rights NGOs monitoring human rights violations in developing countries 
with help of local NGOs, but their findings mostly gets published in Europe and North 
America in order to influence western governments to put pressure on the government of the 
development country. 98 The pressure from regional groups on their own government becomes 
somewhat secondary. Another problem is that local NGOs often get most of their funding 
from, and seek publicity for their activities in the West, instead of from within their own 
countries. This results in accusations of local organization following a “western” agenda and 
they are seen with skepticism from especially Islamic movements. This is a large 
disadvantage when a dialogue on the local level is an absolutely necessary step towards a 
better human rights climate.  
According to An-Na’im, an important step to achieve a larger acceptance and compliance 
with international human right standards, is overcoming what he calls the human rights 
dependency of the regional organizations. The purpose of this is not to end the observations 
and interference of international NGOs, but to improve the coordination and cooperation of 
the regional and local NGOs, to strengthen their position and facilitate their work. 
 
5.3.1 Independent Human Rights NGOs 
When referring to regional NGOs of the Arab world, the definition does not only include the 
organizations operating inside the countries, but also some of the organizations working in 
exile. One problem that might occur with the exile organizations, is establishing whether the 
interest of their members is to actually promote human rights, or if they’re mainly driven by 
political programs of for example an opposition party unable to work within the country. 
Since many of the Arab states are governed by non-democratic regimes, these ambiguities are 
common also among national and regional organizations. 
Human Rights NGOs in a strict sense (trying to exclude those with a political motive), has 
existed in the Arab world since the 70s and began in the countries that had a relative degree of 
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political pluralism. The first established organization was accordingly the Moroccan Human 
Rights Organization, registered in 1972.99 In 1977 this initiative was followed by the 
establishment of the Tunisian League of Human Rights and the Egyptian organization 
“Society of Supporters of Human Rights”, with branches both in Cairo and Alexandria. 
The first sign of a regional cooperation on a non-governmental level came in the 80s with the 
establishment of the AOHR (the Arab Organization of Human Rights). The initiative for the 
establishment of an “umbrella”-organization, that could coordinate strategies for smaller local 
NGOs, emerged already in 1971 on the suggestion of the Iraqi Human Right Organization      
(mention earlier among the government influenced HR-organizations). A preparatory 
committee was set up and a draft for a charter was made, but due to differences about the new 
organization's structure the idea never led to any practical result. In 1983 it was revived by a 
group of Arab intellectuals in Tunisia, and in 1984 the founding conference was held in 
Limassol, Cyprus, as it at the time it was impossible to hold it in any Arab-state. The AOHR 
has had its headquarters in Cairo since the beginning, but it wasn’t until 1993 the organization 
was officially recognized by the government and allowed to hold one of its general meetings 
there.100 According to the Charter of the AOHR, the goals of the organization are: 
- to endeavor to protect the human rights of all persons, in accordance with international 
standards 
- to raise the awareness of the Arab people of their rights 
- to cooperate with other organizations working in this field101 
The AOHR also publishes annual reports on the statues of human rights in the Arab world, a 
series of bulletins and a research journal. However, critics of the AOHR claims that the 
organization has failed in large parts, especially in being an umbrella organization and 
coordinating strategies and common agendas for smaller NGOs in the area.102 
 
In the midst 80s several other significant HR-organizations in various Arab countries and 
among Arab activists in exile, mainly in Western Europe, were founded. Examples in the 
region are the Egyptian organization for Human Rights from 1985103 and the Sudanese 
                                                
99 An-Na’im, p716 
100 Although Human Rights organizations have been more accepted, one example on the personal risk that 
activists still endure is the Libyan opposition figure and member of the Boars of Trustees of AOHR Mansour Al-
Kikhya ”disappeared” in Cairo just after the meeting in 1993 and his whereabouts are still  not know by either 
Egyptian or Libyan authorities   
101 An-Na’im p717 
102 Ibid 
103 Although former problems with registration in Egypt, there is since 1999 a new statue regulating NGOs. The 
Egyptian organizations can now be granted tentative approval, but formal approval is depending on regulations 
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Human Rights Organization founded the same year, but since the military coup in 89 working 
from outside the country. Both these organizations have suffered problems with official 
registration in their countries, a problem that also applies to the Kuwaiti Human Rights 
organization. But there are also many Arab states in which the NGOs are able to officially 
register and thereby work within their countries (Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan 
and Yemen). There was an attempt in 1997 to found a network of Arab activists – the Arab 
Working Group on Human Rights. At first it only had the purpose of working with the 
situation in Algeria, but was gradually expanding to other regional issues. The organization 
did unfortunately terminate itself in 2001, due to operational difficulties.104 
 
From this review of human rights NGOs in the Arab world it is pretty clear that the growth 
and development of these are largely restricted to the North African region, a consequence of 
better possibilities to official registration. On the Asian side of the Arab world, the 
governments, both traditional and secularized, have a stronger tendency to counteract human 
rights activists. For example, in both Sudan and Saudi Arabia HR-activists have been harassed 
or even detained, and organizations have been forced to operate in exile. As mentioned 
before, lots of the exiled NGOs consist of politicians in opposition, and have ulterior motives 
other than protecting the rights of the people. Other governments who support their agenda, 
and have an interest in undermining the government of the NGOs country of origin, are 
therefore often keen to host exile organizations. For example, Syria hosts an Iraqi committee 
for human rights and Iraq does the same for a Syrian organization. There are however exile-
organizations which are generally accepted by observers as legitimate human rights NGOs (ex 
a Syrian organization in Paris and a Bahrainian in Denmark).105 
 
The most recent attempt to create an organization for cooperation on a regional level was the 
Arab Human Rights Movement, who held their first international conference in Casablanca in 
March 1999. It was organized by the Cairo Institute for human rights studies, in collaboration 
of the Moroccan Organization for Human Rights. The conference was attended by about 100 
representatives from different human rights groups from across the Arab world, and resulted 
                                                                                                                                                   
to be issued under the status ( Law No.153 of 1999).  The law however also gives the Minister of Social Affairs 
the right to, without motivation, prohibit any registered association from receiving foreign funding, something 
that may limit the organizations activities severely.  Remarkable about Egypt is also that they also have more 
than specialized human right NGOs, such as the Center for Women’s Rights and Center for the Human rights of 
prisoners, just to mention a couple of them. 
104 An-Naim, p 718 
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in the “Casablanca Declaration of the Arab Human Rights Movement”. The declaration set 
out to deal both with the problem of the acceptance and implementation of human right in the 
Arab world, and the problems of the regional human rights NGOs. It also called for a revision 
of the Arab Charter of human rights, which according to Bahieddin Hassan, the director of the 
Cairo institute, was the worst document ever issued on human rights. The Casablanca 
declaration is critic against the UN for not representing all regions of the world equally, and 
the double standards employed by most notably the US when it comes to applying 
international law differently in various conflicts. It also criticizes the Arab government for 
manipulating the patriotic sentiments in their countries to avoid complying with international 
human rights standards. Iraq, Libya and Syria are further accused of total ignorance of basic 
human rights, while the “back-pedaling” in more secular states such as Egypt, Tunisia, 
Yemen and Jordan is regretted. Morocco is the only country getting positive critic for relative 
progress in human rights questions. The conference also was alarmed by the continued lack of 
a modern legal structure that might facilitate the implementation of human rights in many 
Arab countries. The Arab governments are further encouraged to reform their legislation, 
especially in the field of the right to freedom of expression. The Islamist groups aren’t either 
spared criticism, and are accused of violence and intellectual terrorism. Apart from this 
general, and most of the time rightly-deserved criticism, the Arab Human Rights Movement 
also sets out goals for itself and the local human rights NGOs, stressing the importance of 
among other things the organizations independence from political parties and the 
improvement of the cooperation between the organizations. The organization had a second 
conference in 2001 around the theme of human rights education and dissemination.106 
 
5.3.2 The problems of Arab human rights NGOs 
The NGOs in the Arab world are, as mentioned earlier, suffering from many different 
problems and complications that are severely limiting their activities and possibilities of 
development. Some of these may just be “infant-diseases”, as many of the organizations still 
are relatively new, and can be solved by better organization and enhanced cooperation 
between different organizations. But there are also political and cultural obstacles, both within 
the countries and in their international relations, which are considerably harder to deal with. 
An-Na’im, in his article Human Rights in the Arab World, 2001, summarizes the general 
obstacles as due to seven factors or processes. I’ve decided to use these, although somehow 
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mixed with my own thoughts, since I think they in a relatively objective way points out what 
needs to be considered or improved in order to facilitate a change in the human rights climate 
in the Arab (and probably also in other Muslim) states: 
 
1. Problems with registration and official recognition. Many organizations are consistently 
denied official registration and systematically harassed by the majority of the governments 
of the region. The only government that has declared to permit full registration and legal 
operation, at least for some human right NGOs, is that of Egypt. This is a promise still 
waiting to be fulfilled. 
2. “Unresolved conceptual difficulties”.  As an example of this An-Na’im mentions the lack 
of a strong civil society, aware of its rights and with an effective organization to protect 
them. This is mainly a post-colonial problem, making it a lot easier for the governments to 
disregard human rights without being questioned. Another type of conceptual difficulty 
for the Arab human rights NGOs, is how to deal with the Islamist movement. Should they 
respect the rights of these groups regardless of if they promote a society where not 
everybody’s rights would be treated the same way (ex women and religious minorities), or 
is it permissible to restrict human rights if the mean is to achieve a democratic society? 
3. Distrust of the international community. The insecurity and the sense of being treated 
unjustly by the international community, is an obstacle for popular acceptance of human 
rights, as they still are seen as a western concept. This distrust is hard to argue with, 
especially after the way the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been handled all the way since 
1948, but with emphasize on the later years of occupations and group punishments of 
Palestinians remotely related to suicide bombers. Europe, but mainly the US have had a 
tendency to support opposition groups to achieve a change of regimes, not considering (or 
caring..) whether the new regime is in any way better or more democratic than the former 
one. The most flagrant example is the former American support of the Talibans in 
Afghanistan. This is also a source of skepticism. The most recent example of western 
interference is the Iraqi conflicts. It is no coincidence that the Arab people (or anyone else 
for that matter..) have difficulties understanding how International Law doesn’t seem to 
apply equally to all states, and whatever the motives of the last invasion of Iraq was the 
justification of it seems rather vague. The list could be made much longer, but the point is 
that an irregular use of international law, dependent on which country one is dealing with, 
will only increase the anti-western currents we see today. This leads to a more difficult 
situation for those who work for a more democratic society and human rights. Arab 
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human rights advocates are often described in popular discourse as “traitors”, trying to 
impose Western values and institutions. Western governments are associated with unjust 
politics. 
4.  Lack of an internal philosophical and cultural justification for human rights principles.  
The concept of universal human rights has its roots in Western philosophy and culture. 
They are consequently often considered part of a neo-colonial hegemony, and there is a 
tendency to emphasize on confronting the West rather than working on internal issues of 
political and social transformation. A severe lack of tradition of civil activism and 
regional NGOs is also a problem. 
5. The weakness of Arab human rights NGOs and the relationship with international 
organizations.  Human rights in this part of the world are protected through economic or 
political pressure from the West, rather than through internal activities of civil society. 
This among other factors lead to serious differences of opinion between local and 
international NGOs regarding for example humanitarian intervention, economic sanctions 
and political conditions in economic and military aid. The influence of international 
organizations is also limited in developing countries, since many violations fall outside the 
scope of international law. Militant Islamic groups are for example not subjects of 
international law, as they are not states, and they can consequently not be held 
accountable for their human rights violations. Human rights law is also meaningless in 
“collapsed states” like Somalia, and states in civil war like Algeria. The relationship 
between international and local organizations is also complicated by lack of coordination 
and cooperation. Conflicting priorities has a tendency to lead the marginalization of the 
local organization that doesn’t have as much financial or political support.  
6. The politicization of Arab Human Rights movements. As mentioned earlier many of the 
local human rights organizations are, at least to begin with, dominated by one certain 
ideological group. This alienates people who might believe in the same cause but from a 
different political or religious perspective. It has also in many cases, like for example the 
AOHR, led to internal rivalries for leadership and difficulties in agreeing on how to 
address major crises like the invasion of Kuwait. These internal struggles for power do 
serious damage to the credibility of the organization, both in the eyes of international 
organs, as well as the public in the Arab countries. Another dilemma that has appeared is 
the strong emergence of Islamic activism during the last couple of years. To not loose 
their already weak public support, leaders of human rights organizations are afraid to be 
branded anti-Islamic. It therefore becomes difficult for them to challenge contradictions 
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between international human rights standards and Sharía based principles, such as the 
rights of women and non-Muslims.  
7. Institutional weakness.  This aspect is linked to several of the other above-mentioned 
factors, such as the lack of recognition and the constant harassment of human rights 
activists. The lack of an “umbrella” organization, as the AOHR failed to be, also leads to a 
difficulty in showing a united front against authorities and international institutions. The 
inability for Arab HR organizations to develop strategies for negotiating with the 
governments of the region is also a problem. 
                                                                                 
The importance of dealing with these problems of the regional NGOs really can’t be stressed 
enough. If the goal is to achieve a general understanding and tolerance of human rights among 
people in general, not only on a governmental level, and in a longer perspective educate 
people of their rights so that they themselves can claim them from the often not very 
democratic regimes in the Arab world, the work of the local organizations is invaluable. Since 
they are a part of the culture and traditions with which the international rules sometimes clash, 
their comprehension of problems in the implementation of these rules is wider than that of 
international human rights NGOs, and their possibility to find a tolerable solution is 
consequently much bigger.  
 
 
5.4 Islamic Fundamentalism and Human Rights 
Several of the complicated issues the regional human rights NGOs deal with, are in some way 
connected to the antagonism between fundamentalists and more liberal Muslims. I therefore 
thought it would be interesting to establish whether there exist any fundamentalist human 
rights movements. First we however have to define fundamentalism. The word has been given 
an undoubtedly negative meaning lately, and in media it is often limited to the most extreme 
traditionalist movements in Islam, and also wrongly connected to terrorism. For this reason I 
will instead use the term “political Islam”. Political Islam includes a diversity of movements 
advocating and practicing Islamic politics, and they all have an Islamic agenda. The goal is 
rarely trying to create a legal and political system entirely based on Sharía, but to implement 
the ideas of Islam to different degrees. Political Islam exists both in power and in opposition 
in different countries in the Arabic (Islamic) world. The best known example of Islamists in a 
governing position is the regime in Iran. Opposition movements or parties exist probably in 
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all Islamic countries where they’re not in a governing position. Many human rights activists in 
the region are of the opinion that human rights can under no circumstances be combined with 
political Islam. Others claim that although members of fundamentalist organizations are 
fighting for human rights, the interest is only to protect the rights of their own members, who 
in many countries due to being opposed to a governing regime are subject to harassment and 
violation of their rights.107 Among groups of secularized intellectuals it is even a dilemma 
whether to grant fundamentalists the same rights as everybody else, since this potentially may 
lead to them seizing power, creating a system where the rights of some will be denied. 
Obviously this is a serious dilemma. Universal human rights are not supposed to depend on 
the consequences of granting them to non-democratic groups, as this would undermine the 
whole moral perspective of universality.  
Within the political Islam movements, as in any other ideological movements, a variety of 
different standpoints on human rights issues can be found. The National Islamic Front (NIF) 
in Sudan is one example of an Islamic movement whose main ideologue rejects human rights, 
considering them a product of positivist and materialist Western jurisprudence. Hassan Al-
Turabi from the NIF, the only member of the organization who has written about this 
ideology, describes an ideal Islamic society based on liberation from positivist and materialist 
chains, and with absolute loyal to God. Such a society would not need any rights invoked 
from an authority108. Sheik Rached Al-Gannouchi, is the leader of the Tunisian An-Nahda 
political party (an Islamic party). His opinion is often quoted in the debate about human rights 
and Islamic fundamentalism. He is not directly dismissing human rights as a concept, but he 
does express the common opinion that it is an issue over which secularists exercise a 
monopoly.109 This is fueled by the fact that leftists, that are traditional enemies of the Islamic 
trends, lead most human rights organizations. The Islamic fundamentalists, or advocates of 
political Islam, do however suffer from partly the same problems as the human rights 
activists. In many countries, the Islamist are harassed and persecuted, and their human rights 
are often violated. There is however a skepticism towards them among the advocates for 
human rights. Even in cases where they might support human rights, they are rarely taken 
seriously or allowed to participate in the more established human rights NGOs. 
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But human rights activities exist within the Islamic movements too. Since there are obvious 
contradictions between human right standards and a strict Islamic agenda, these movements 
are suspected of being less serious or having ulterior motives. They also suffer from the 
problem in claiming they promote human rights, but not being able to offer the same 
protection for everybody. In Iran there are for example Islamist women’s rights organizations, 
working very actively for a reinterpretation of the Qur’an, to achieve more equal rights for 
women. Since they still agree with many of the rules discriminating against women, they 
however fail to protect the rights of secular women. The secular women still have no choice 
but to apply to rules set in the name of a religion they don’t belong to, and which highly limits 
their rights and freedoms.110 One country, in which there has been an increasing interest in 
human rights connected to movements with Islamic background, is Egypt. In Egypt there has 
been a methodical governmental suppression of organizations and institutions during the last 
decade, for example changing laws to make it more difficult to register associations. In the 
early 90s professional associations like the Medical syndicate and the Engineers syndicate, 
which both are organizations mainly controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, formed human 
rights committees. They began to campaign on behalf of their members, who suffered from 
for example persecution on political grounds or in other ways got their individual rights 
violated. The Islamic influence in the Bar association, traditionally known for supporting 
human rights, has also increased. This development towards a higher percentage of Islamic 
members in the human rights activism could in later years be seen in several organizations in 
Egypt. In the EOHR (Egyptian Organization of Human Rights) there are even persons 
associated with political Islam as members of the executive board. It is however hard to reach 
any conclusion to whether these attempts of Islamic human rights activities were seriously 
meant, or as critics claimed only in their own interest and as a forum for opposition politics. 
The syndicates, who were the major venues for Islamic human rights activities, fell victim to 
state repression and most leaders where sentenced to prison in 95-96. This stagnated the 
development, and the true nature of their commitment to human rights remains hard to 
analyze111.  
 
The most interesting example of an explicit Islamic human rights movement that I have come 
across in my research is the Turkish “Mazlumder” movement. Turkey is quite different from 
the Arab states that I mainly have been using as objects of discussion earlier in this essay. It 
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has been, at least in theory, a secularized state since the modern Turkish states was established 
in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Still, the Turkish State is not neutral in the question of 
religion. There is for example a state-approved version of Islam, and the Imams are employed 
by the state.112 
In difference to Egypt, Turkey usually has at least one Islamist party that is allowed to 
participate on the political scene (although from time to time banned, but the often re-opened 
under a different name). The Refah (welfare) Party served as part of a governing coalition, 
after getting over 20% of the votes, which made them the largest party in 1995-96. Their 
leader Necmettin Erbakan became the countries first Islamist Prime minister. The Erbakan 
government was however removed after military pressure, and the party, who also had been 
very successful in local elections and was controlling both Istanbul and the capital Ankara, 
was banned for being a threat to the secular state. The Fazilet (virtue) Party emerged in its 
place to be banned in 2001 and replaced by two new Islamist parties.113 The Islamist parties 
have not had an outspoken human rights agenda. They have been involved in certain issues 
with a human rights connection, like calling for a liberalization of the laws restricting freedom 
of expression on the issue of secularism, and an end to the banning of parties. Critics of 
course claims that they only care about human rights when it is in their own interest, but the 
Islamist party probably doesn't show more or less interest in human rights than any of the 
other established parties.114  Beyond the political scene there is however an ongoing 
development of associations promoting Islamic liberalism. Although these groups are no 
typical human rights movements, they have played an important role in bringing the human 
rights concept into the contemporary Islamic discourse. Examples of Islamic Liberalistic 
associations in Turkey are the Nurcu movement, associated with the teachings of Said Nursi, 
and the Fethullah Gulen, a more nationalistic movement. The intellectual climate in Turkey is 
in general more open to the ideas of liberalism and human rights than in for example Egypt. 
In 1991 an organization, the earlier mentioned organization the Mazlumder (The Organization 
of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People) was founded.115 This organization, 
which might be seen as proof of a possible Islamist human rights activism, was founded by a 
group of activists with the roots in the political Islamic movements. They set out to defend the 
human rights of everybody, regardless of political affiliation or religious preferences, 
implicitly criticizing other organizations for not doing so. Mazlumder has a good record of 
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establishing successful working relations with other human rights organizations, and is now 
one of the largest human rights NGOs in Turkey. It is also among the NGOs that the 
government cooperates with116. In its documents, the Mazlumder shows a universalistic vision 
of human rights, compatible with international standards. An example from their information 
sheet “On the side of all oppressed against all oppressors”: 
 
“Mazlumder believes that human rights are universal, and that the source of human 
rights is the fact that individuals were created as human beings. Thus, natural law – 
divine law – constitutes the foundation of human rights. Mazlumder does not 
support the idea that there are either cultural or regional differences in basic human 
rights.” 
 
The movement has according to its leader Yilmas Ensaraglu helped the development, and 
broadening the sensitivity to human rights among religious people and the political right. He 
does however admit that the organization still has problems overcoming the image opposed 
upon it by people who are not exposed to their work, meaning that no matter what they do 
they are still suspected of being a fundamentalist group working only in their own interest. 
Still, Mazlumder tries to be an alternative for Muslims who believe that political Islam and 
human rights are not an impossible combination, and as mentioned earlier they do have a very 
good record of cooperating with a range of groups that are not in associated with the political 
Islamic trend117.  
 
 
6. Conclusion   
Many times during the process of writing this essay, I’ve felt compelled to change the 
question I’d be answering from being whether Islamic law is compatible with universal 
human rights, to whether universal human right are a mainly Western idea, and if it in that 
case is within our right to, without compromise, claim supremacy for them over other 
conflicting rules, regardless of their foundation or legitimacy. I however made the decision to 
not make this about the justification of the universality of human rights, and instead chose to 
just presume them as a reasonable standard most individuals would benefit from being 
granted. I do still think that it is an important point to keep the discussion of cultural 
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relativism open, since there are obvious problems in the practical aspect of trying to 
implement human rights in parts of the world outside our western sphere. I think we have to 
acknowledge and respect that other cultures might need to find their own way of justifying 
human rights, to be able to give them an impact on people on a grass-root level. It is also very 
important to keep in mind the strength of religion in large parts of the world. We should not 
underestimate the problem that it constitutes to implement and motivate universal human 
rights, since religious values as we have seen examples of in Islam, does not always comply 
with them. Whether or not we consider “our” universal human rights as the right minimum 
standard to set for the protection of the individual, we have to accept the existence of other 
standpoints to be able to solve the practical problems surrounding human rights issues in 
many third world countries. The Islamic human rights documents are a very good example of 
how, even though in some of them the will to compromise exists, some religious values and 
rules will make it almost impossible to completely reach the standard set by the UN. Rules on 
blasphemy and apostasy will in an Islamic state inevitably constitute a problem for the 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Also the fact that women have a different role 
in Islam, which can't be changed even by a severe reinterpretation of the Qur’an, constitutes a 
breach of international rules. But even though the documents where direct references to the 
Sharía are made does not constitute sufficient protection for human rights, it is important to 
appreciate that at least in later documents, as the Cairo Declaration and the Arab Charter, an 
effort is made on an intergovernmental level to adjust to UN-standards. Even if the result is 
not always fully satisfying from a western standpoint, one must remember that the mere 
existence of a discourse is a progress in some of the Arab countries.   
 
The Islamic states record of ratification of international human rights treaties also leave a lot 
left to ask for. On one hand the members of the OIC that have not ratified any of the two 
Covenants represent “only” thirty percent of the total of states that stand outside these 
important human rights treaties. But many of the non-ratifying Islamic states are countries 
with rather large populations such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Malaysia, while most of the 
remaining states with a poor record of ratifying are tiny Caribbean or Pacific islands with 
small populations. It is consequently reasonable to say that the Islamic countries in reality 
represent a larger problem when it comes to non-ratification than statistics may show. The 
combination of this, and the Islamic human rights documents not fully complying with 
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international standards and therefore failing as an alternative way of achieving sufficient 
protection, makes it impossible not to conclude that the Islamic countries, even if maybe 
unfairly seen as a collective, according to UN standards have a lower degree of protection of 
human rights. 
It is also important to notice that the Islamic human rights documents mentioned earlier, even 
though some of them represent descent attempts to create an Islamic alternative to the 
international equivalence, have not been ratified in any of the Islamic or Arabic states that 
have produced them. In practice, their impact on the human rights situation is therefore 
limited. 
 
International institutions and other governments at the moment mainly make the pressure of 
imposing human rights in Muslims countries. One interesting aspect of this is that the states 
that have the worst records of ratification of UN documents, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
the United Arab Emirate, seem to be less in focus than for example Iran or Iraq, who at least 
on paper have rather good records of ratification.  This can hardly be explained by the former 
countries having a better situation when it comes to human rights organizations, or less 
violations of human rights. The lack of democracy and the situation of for example women or 
religious minorities are just as bad, if not worse, in for example Saudi Arabia, than in any 
other Arab country. I’ll leave it unsaid whether this has a connection to the richer Arab 
countries being important oil-producers, but the consequence is as always that the credibility 
and the legitimacy of the western countries concern in the human rights situation in the Arab 
world may be jeopardized. The indictments for implementations must in larger part come 
from the people of the Muslim countries to start with, but if and when pressure comes from 
other foreign parties, it is of great importance that it is made in a way that seems “fair” and 
proportional to the people of the region. If large discrepancies exist in the treatment between 
countries, the justification of international law as anything else than random and ruled by 
political interests, rather than actual concern for protection of individuals, is precluded. 
One may also consider that the ratification of UN documents is not always the best 
measurement of a country’s devotion to human rights. Many states might be parties to 
conventions without actually applying their rules in reality. Another problem is that states are 
not the only violators of the rights of its citizens. For example fundamentalist movements or 
rebel groups often commit violations. With those violations, whether or not a state has signed 
the Bill of Rights becomes irrelevant. 
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When it comes to the specific problems Islamic countries have with the adjustment to 
international human rights, different solutions are being suggested in the debate among 
Muslims themselves. Reformists claim that reinterpreting the Sharía would be the only way to 
adjust Islam to the modern world. But the call for reformation seems to mainly come from 
Muslims in exile in the west. In most Islamic countries, there has instead been an increasing 
support for an “Islamization”, where the society and legal systems are more adjusted to Sharía 
and religion in general. Political systems such as in Saudi Arabia and Iran are good examples 
of this kind of politized Islam. There does not seem to exist any wider support for reformation 
among the people in the Arab countries, which in practice makes it a less viable solution. The 
theories on why the idea of a stricter Islamic society appears to appeal to a lot of people in the 
Middle East are many. I think there is little doubt that the polarization between east and west, 
caused by the political tension in the region, leads to the anti-western currents that often 
pushes people to take a more extreme position to the opposite side than they would normally 
do.  Fighting against a common external enemy also makes people more inclined to forget 
about their own rights, and focus solely on the preservation and defense of their culture. The 
dissatisfaction with the international community is another source of concern, since it leads to 
an increased feeling of isolation, and conviction that western values are imposed without any 
consideration to local customs or beliefs.  
An effort to try to bring the Islamic world closer to our western human rights through 
reinterpretation of the Qur’an and Sharía, would only work if it had a major support from the 
people who would be affected by such a change. As Bassam Tibi expresses it; “..the 
accommodation of Islam to cultural modernity must take place from the inside and be carried 
out by Muslims themselves.” 118 Since at the moment no broad support for reformation among 
Muslims seems to exist, at least not in the Arab countries, the chance of any real change in 
this manner appears unrealistic to me. 
 
The other possibility often mentioned to solve the conflicts between Islamic law and 
international human rights, is the liberal idea of secularization. With my limited knowledge of 
Islam I can see how a reinterpretation of the Sharia would facilitate the adjustment to 
international standards, but I think that the only way to actually be able to adjust fully to 
international law would be secularization. Since the universal human rights are theoretically 
based in secularization between state and religion, the religious values are going to be hard to 
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combine with them in some aspects. As I see it, a system based on the Sharía, even in the case 
of a rather liberal interpretation, will never be completely compatible with the standards of 
universal human rights as defined by the UN. The problem with segregation between state and 
religion is on the other hand identical with the complexity of reinterpretation (reformatism). 
As long as there is no support at a grass root level, the organic process that such a large 
change of society would demand is not possible. 
 
 In practice the problem of a human rights adjustment in the Islamic world, and the Middle 
East in particular, is even bigger and more complex than in theory. The local and regional 
human rights NGOs suffer from huge difficulties, from being prohibited to register their 
organizations and being harassed by the authorities, to being seen with skepticism from the 
people of their own countries for being traitors trying to impose western values. The 
international organizations are met with an even larger skepticism, and have the disadvantage 
of not being able to completely appreciate the cultural differences, since they are not a part of 
either the culture or religion of the region. As long as human rights are seen as a western set 
of values, the growing anti-western currents, caused by political double standards and the 
obvious abuse of international law during the latest invasion of Iraq and in Israel, constitute 
an obstacle for the acceptance of human rights in these countries.  I think it is important to get 
the human rights activity down to a lower level and try to support an increased knowledge and 
understanding among "normal" people of what rights for the individual the universal human 
rights signify. If the discussion is only carried out on a governmental level, or by academic 
scholars, the acceptance will never reach the local level, and human rights will only have a 
theoretical not practical relevance. I also think that most people, if rightly informed about 
individual human rights, would not be opposed to the concept regardless of what culture or 
religion they belong to. If pressure is put on the governments or undemocratic regimes from 
their own people, and not only by foreign bodies, they would probably have to make a larger 
effort to adjust their legal systems and grant the individuals the rights they deserve. It is also 
very important that international human rights NGOs cooperate with the regional 
organizations to a greater extent, to help achieve increased knowledge of human rights among 
the people of the Arab world.  
 
The most important thing as I see it, is however for all parties, to by increased knowledge and 
understanding try to deal with the problems cultural and religious differences bring. 
Compromising must be done without blindly judging the opposite side as the one being 
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wrong, and by trying to see past old prejudice and political history. The implementation of 
human rights needs to be an organic process, where consideration is taken to the fact that 
international law after all basically is European law (and North American). International law 
is not culturally sensitive, and there is little room for regional variety based in the actual 
differences existing. New states are automatically bound by already existing rules, of which 
many are based back in the times when large parts of the world were still colonized. The idea 
of an international community rests on the assumption of a substantial cultural consensus on 
international law, and I think we have to at least start with admitting that this assumption is 
wrong. In many parts of the world outside our western cultural sphere, historical anchorage to 
the development of international law is lacking, as well as philosophical grounds of their own 
to explain the idea behind universal human rights. As stated earlier, human rights are derived 
from Western sources and philosophies, and it is not always easy for people raised in other 
cultures to just blindly accept or understand our justification of them. Especially in the parts 
of the world where religion has a strong position, our secularized idea of human rights not 
granted by a God, easily becomes secondary to the rights that purposively are of divine 
source. This does not necessarily mean that we should stop our intents to spread an 
implementation of human rights in parts of the world where the understanding for them as a 
concept is not obvious. But we might have to revaluate the way we do it – if not we are 
risking a situation where human rights becomes just another part of what often is seen as 
imperialism through political pressure. All real change must come through a combination of 
input from international organizations, and local adjustment based on an actual understanding 
and acceptance of the international rules and their extraction. It is also possible that the 
support for human rights would increase in third world countries, if the importance of later 
generations of rights, such as the collective rights to for example economic and social 
development, would be more in focus.  These rights are obviously of more interest in under-
developed countries, but often get a lower priority in the debate of human rights in the West. 
 
 To conclude, the Islamic parts of the world include a variety of countries that are secularized 
at different levels, and where the Islamic interpretations may be very miscellaneous. There is 
no way getting around that large problems with violations of rights of women or religious 
minorities exist in many of these countries, whether or not this is due to religion.  A strict 
interpretation of the Sharía does also leave room for restrictions in some of the rights we 
consider universal, and this should not be defended. We must however take into account that 
Islam is the religion of millions of people in the world. To just dismiss the influence it has on 
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them, and to not understand the complications that inevitably follows when trying to force 
them to embrace rules, that in their point of view might go against the will of God, is not only 
disrespectful but also futile. This is the main reason to why all implementation of human 
rights, should be done in cooperation with local organizations that know how to help facilitate 
the process, through for example education of the affected people. This will eventually help 
the adaptation of the concepts of human rights, into their different religious and cultural 
context. 
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The Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (Session of Peace, Interdependence 
and Development), held in Cairo, Arab Republic of Egypt, from 9-14 Muharram 1411H (31 
July to 5 August 1990),  
Keenly aware of the place of mankind in Islam as vicegerent of Allah on Earth;  
Recognizing the importance of issuing a Document on Human Rights in Islam that will serve 
as a guide for Member states in all aspects of life; 
Having examined the stages through which the preparation of this draft Document has so far, 
passed and the relevant report of the Secretary General; 
Having examined the Report of the Meeting of the Committee of Legal Experts held in 
Tehran from 26 to 28 December, 1989; 
Agrees to issue the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam that will serve as a general 
guidance for Member States in the Field of human rights. 
Reaffirming the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which Allah made as the 
best community and which gave humanity a universal and well-balanced civilization, in 
which harmony is established between hereunder and the hereafter, knowledge is combined 
with faith, and to fulfill the expectations from this community to guide all humanity which is 
confused because of different and conflicting beliefs and ideologies and to provide solutions 
for all chronic problems of this materialistic civilization. 
In contribution to the efforts of mankind to assert human rights, to protect man from 
exploitation and persecution, and to affirm his freedom and right to a dignified life in 
accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah. 
Convinced that mankind which has reached an advanced stage in materialistic science is still, 
and shall remain, in dire need of faith to support its civilization as well as a self motivating 
force to guard its rights; 
Believing that fundamental rights and freedoms according to Islam are an integral part of the 
Islamic religion and that no one shall have the right as a matter of principle to abolish them 
either in whole or in part or to violate or ignore them in as much as they are binding divine 
commands, which are contained in the Revealed Books of Allah and which were sent through 
the last of His Prophets to complete the preceding divine messages and that safeguarding 
those fundamental rights and freedoms is an act of worship whereas the neglect or violation 
thereof is an abominable sin, and that the safeguarding of those fundamental rights and 
freedom is an individual responsibility of every person and a collective responsibility of the 
entire Ummah; 
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Do hereby and on the basis of the above-mentioned principles declare as follows: 
 
ARTICLE 1:  
(a) All human beings form one family whose members are united by their subordination to 
Allah and descent from Adam. All men are equal in terms of basic human dignity and basic 
obligations and responsibilities, without any discrimination on the basis of race, colour, 
language, belief, sex, religion, political affiliation, social status or other considerations. The 
true religion is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to human integrity. 
(b) All human beings are Allah's subjects, and the most loved by Him are those who are most 
beneficial to His subjects, and no one has superiority over another except on the basis of piety 
and good deeds. 
 
ARTICLE 2: 
(a) Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the 
duty of individuals, societies and states to safeguard this right against any violation, and it is 
prohibited to take away life except for a shari'ah prescribed reason. 
(b) It is forbidden to resort to any means which could result in the genocidal annihilation of 
mankind. 
(c) The preservation of human life throughout the term of time willed by Allah is a duty 
prescribed by Shari'ah. 
(d) Safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right. It is the duty of the state to safeguard it, and 
it is prohibited to breach it without a Shari'ah-prescribed reason. 
 
ARTICLE 3: 
(a) In the event of the use of force and in case of armed conflict, it is not permissible to kill 
non-belligerents such as old men, women and children. The wounded and the sick shall have 
the right to medical treatment; and prisoners of war shall have the right to be fed, sheltered 
and clothed. It is prohibited to mutilate or dismember dead bodies. It is required to exchange 
prisoners of war and to arrange visits or reunions of families separated by circumstances of 
war. 
(b) It is prohibited to cut down trees, to destroy crops or livestock, to destroy the enemy's 
civilian buildings and installations by shelling, blasting or any other means. 
 
ARTICLE 4: 
Every human being is entitled to human sanctity and the protection of one's good name and 
honour during one's life and after one's death. The state and the society shall protect one's 
body and burial place from desecration. 
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ARTICLE 5: 
(a) The family is the foundation of society, and marriage is the basis of making a family. Men 
and women have the right to marriage, and no restrictions stemming from race, colour or 
nationality shall prevent them from exercising this right. 
(b) The society and the State shall remove all obstacles to marriage and facilitate it, and shall 
protect the family and safeguard its welfare. 
 
ARTICLE 6: 
(a) Woman is equal to man in human dignity, and has her own rights to enjoy as well as duties 
to perform, and has her own civil entity and financial independence, and the right to retain her 
name and lineage. 
(b) The husband is responsible for the maintenance and welfare of the family. 
 
ARTICLE 7: 
(a) As of the moment of birth, every child has rights due from the parents, the society and the 
state to be accorded proper nursing, education and material, hygienic and moral care. Both the 
fetus and the mother must be safeguarded and accorded special care. 
(b) Parents and those in such like capacity have the right to choose the type of education they 
desire for their children, provided they take into consideration the interest and future of the 
children in accordance with ethical values and the principles of the Shari'ah. 
(c) Both parents are entitled to certain rights from their children, and relatives are entitled to 
rights from their kin, in accordance with the tenets of the shari'ah. 
 
ARTCLE 8: 
Every human being has the right to enjoy a legitimate eligibility with all its prerogatives and 
obligations in case such eligibility is lost or impaired, the person shall have the right to be 
represented by his/her guardian. 
ARTICLE 9: 
(a) The seeking of knowledge is an obligation and provision of education is the duty of the 
society and the State. The State shall ensure the availability of ways and means to acquire 
education and shall guarantee its diversity in the interest of the society so as to enable man to 
be acquainted with the religion of Islam and uncover the secrets of the Universe for the 
benefit of mankind. 
(b) Every human being has a right to receive both religious and worldly education from the 
various institutions of teaching, education and guidance, including the family, the school, the 
university, the media, etc., and in such an integrated and balanced manner that would develop 
human personality, strengthen man's faith in Allah and promote man's respect to and defence 
of both rights and obligations.  
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ARTICLE 10: 
Islam is the religion of true unspoiled nature. It is prohibited to exercise any form of pressure 
on man or to exploit his poverty or ignorance in order to force him to change his religion to 
another religion or to atheism.  
 
ARTICLE 11: 
(a) Human beings are born free, and no one has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress or 
exploit them, and there can be no subjugation but to Allah the Almighty. 
(b) Colonialism of all types being one of the most evil forms of enslavement is totally 
prohibited. Peoples suffering from colonialism have the full right to freedom and self-
determination. It is the duty of all States peoples to support the struggle of colonized peoples 
for the liquidation of all forms of and occupation, and all States and peoples have the right to 
preserve their independent identity and econtrol over their wealth and natural resources. 
 
ARTICLE 12: 
 
Every man shall have the right, within the framework of the Shari'ah, to free movement and to 
select his place of residence whether within or outside his country and if persecuted, is 
entitled to seek asylum in another country. The country of refuge shall be obliged to provide 
protection to the asylum-seeker until his safety has been attained, unless asylum is motivated 
by committing an act regarded by the Shari'ah as a crime.  
 
 
ARTICLE 13: 
Work is a right guaranteed by the State and the Society for each person with capability to 
work. Everyone shall be free to choose the work that suits him best and which serves his 
interests as well as those of the society. The employee shall have the right to enjoy safety and 
security as well as all other social guarantees. He may not be assigned work beyond his 
capacity nor shall he be subjected to compulsion or exploited or harmed in any way. He shall 
be entitled - without any discrimination between males and females - to fair wages for his 
work without delay, as well as to the holidays allowances and promotions which he deserves. 
On his part, he shall be required to be dedicated and meticulous in his work. Should workers 
and employers disagree on any matter, the State shall intervene to settle the dispute and have 
the grievances redressed, the rights confirmed and justice enforced without bias. 
 
ARTICLE 14: 
Everyone shall have the right to earn a legitimate living without monopolization, deceit or 
causing harm to oneself or to others. Usury (riba) is explicitly prohibited. 
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ARTICLE 15: 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to own property acquired in a legitimate way, and shall be 
entitled to the rights of ownership without prejudice to oneself, others or the society in 
general. Expropriation is not permissible except for requirements of public interest and upon 
payment of prompt and fair compensation.  
(b) Confiscation and seizure of property is prohibited except for a necessity dictated by law. 
 
ARTICLE 16: 
Everyone shall have the right to enjoy the fruits of his scientific, literary, artistic or technical 
labour of which he is the author; and he shall have the right to the protection of his moral and 
material interests stemming therefrom, provided it is not contrary to the principles of the 
Shari'ah. 
 
 
ARTICLE 17: 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to live in a clean environment, away from vice and moral 
corruption, that would favour a healthy ethical development of his person and it is incumbent 
upon the State and society in general to afford that right. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to medical and social care, and to all public amenities 
provided by society and the State within the limits of their available resources. 
(c) The States shall ensure the right of the individual to a decent living that may enable him to 
meet his requirements and those of his dependents, including food, clothing, housing, 
education, medical care and all other basic needs. 
 
ARTICLE 18: 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to live in security for himself, his religion, his dependents, 
his honour and his property. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to privacy in the conduct of his private affairs, in his home, 
among his family, with regard to his property and his relationships. It is not permitted to spy 
on him, to place him under surveillance or to besmirch his good name. The State shall protect 
him from arbitrary interference. 
(c) A private residence is inviolable in all cases. It will not be entered without permission 
from its inhabitants or in any unlawful manner, nor shall it be demolished or confiscated and 
its dwellers evicted. 
 
 
ARTICLE 19: 
 82 
(a) All individuals are equal before the law, without distinction between the ruler and the 
ruled. 
(b) The right to resort to justice is guaranteed to everyone. 
(c) Liability is in essence personal. 
(d) There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided for in the Shari'ah. 
(e) A defendant is innocent until his guilt is proven in a fast trial in which he shall be given all 
the guarantees of defence. 
 
ARTICLE 20: 
It is not permitted without legitimate reason to arrest an individual, or restrict his freedom, to 
exile or to punish him. It is not permitted to subject him to physical or psychological torture 
or to any form of maltreatment, cruelty or indignity. Nor is it permitted to subject an 
individual to medical or scientific experiments without hisconsent or at the risk of his health 
or of his life. Nor is it permitted to promulgate emergency laws that would provide executive 
authority for such actions. 
 
ARTICLE 21: 
Taking hostages under any form or for any purpose is expressly forbidden. 
 
ARTICLE 22: 
(a) Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as would not be 
contrary to the principles of the Shari'ah. 
1.. Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is right, and propagate what is good, and 
warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic Shari'ah.  
(c) Information is a vital necessity to society. It may not be exploited or misused in such a 
way as may violate sanctities and the dignity of Prophets, undermine moral and ethical Values 
or disintegrate, corrupt or harm society or weaken its faith. 
(d) It is not permitted to excite nationalistic or doctrinal hatred or to do anything that may be 
an incitement to any form or racial discrimination. 
 
ARTICLE 23: 
(a) Authority is a trust; and abuse or malicious exploitation thereof is explicitly prohibited, in 
order to guarantee fundamental human rights. 
(b) Everyone shall have the right to participate, directly or indirectly in the administration of 
his country's public affairs. He shall also have the right to assume public office in accordance 
with the provisions of Shari'ah. 
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ARTICLE 24: 
All the rights and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah. 
 
???? ???????
The Islamic Shari'ah is the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification of any 
of the articles of this Declaration.  
??
 
 
Home || Treaties || Search || Links  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
???
 
 
Arab Charter on Huma Rights, adopted by the League of Arab States, 
reprinted in 18 Hum. Rts. L.J. 151 (1997). 
 
 
Council of the League of Arab States, Cairo?
Arab Charter on Human Rights ?
adopted on 15 September 1994 (not yet ratified as of 30 June 1997), full text (1), translated 
from Arabic (2) ?
" The Governments of the member States of the League of Arab States (3)?
 
Preamble?
Given the Arab nation's belief in human dignity since God honoured it by making the Arab 
World the cradle of religions and the birthplace of civilizations which confirmed its right to a 
life of dignity based on freedom, justice and peace,?
 
Pursuant to the eternal principles of brotherhood and equality among all human beings which 
were firmly established by the Islamic Shari'a and the other divinely-revealed religions,?
 
Being proud of the humanitarian values and principles which it firmly established in the 
course of its long history and which played a major role in disseminating centres of learning 
between the East and the West, thereby making it an international focal point for seekers of 
knowledge, culture and wisdom,?
 
Conscious of the fact that the entire Arab World has always worked together to preserve its 
faith, believing in its unity, struggling to protect its freedom, defending the right of nations to 
self-determination and to safeguard their resources, believing in the rule of law and that every 
individual's enjoyment of freedom, justice and equality of opportunity is the yardstick by 
which the merits of any society are gauged,?
 
Rejecting racism and zionism, which constitute a violation of human rights and pose a threat 
to world peace,?
 
Acknowledging the close interrelationship between human rights and world peace,?
Reaffirming the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as the provisions of the United Nations International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Cairo Declaration 
on Human Rights in Islam (4)?
 
In confirmation of all the above, have agreed as follows :?
 
 
 
 
Part I?
 85 
 
Article 1?
 
(a) All peoples have the right of self-determination and control over their natural wealth and 
resources and, accordingly, have the right to freely determine the form of their political 
structure and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.?
 
(b) Racism, zionism, occupation and foreign domination pose a challenge to human dignity 
and constitute a fundamental obstacle to the realization of the basic rights of peoples. There is 
a need to condemn and endeavour to eliminate all such practices.?
 
Part II?
 
Article 2?
 
Each State Party to the present Charter undertakes to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its Jurisdiction the right to enjoy all the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein, without any distinction on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status and without any 
discrimination between men and women.?
 
Article 3?
 
(a) No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or 
existing in any State Party to the present Charter in virtue of law, conventions or custom shall 
be admitted on the pretext that the present Charter does not recognize such rights or that it 
recognizes them to a lesser extent.?
 
(b) No State Party to the present Charter shall derogate from the fundamental freedoms 
recognized herein and which are enjoyed by the nationals of another State that shows less 
respect for those freedoms.?
 
Article 4?
 
(a) No restrictions shall be placed on the rights and freedoms recognized in the present 
Charter except where such is provided by law and deemed necessary to protect the national 
security and economy, public order, health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.?
 
(b) In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, the States Parties may 
take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Charter to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation.?
 
(c) Such measures or derogations shall under no circumstances affect or apply to the rights 
and special guarantees concerning the prohibition of torture and degrading treatment, return to 
one's country, political asylum, trial, the inadmissibility of retrial for the same act, and the 
legal status of crime and punishment.?
 
 
 
Article 5?
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Every individual has the right to life, liberty and security of person. These rights shall be 
protected by law.?
 
Article 6?
 
There shall be no crime or punishment except as provided by law and there shall be no 
punishment in respect of an act preceding the promulgation of that provision. The accused 
shall benefit from subsequent legislation if it is in his favour.?
 
Article 7?
 
The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty at a lawful trial in which he has 
enjoyed the guarantees necessary for his defence.?
 
Article 8?
 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person and no one shall be arrested, held in 
custody or detained without a legal warrant and without being brought promptly before a 
judge.?
 
Article 9?
 
All persons are equal before the law and everyone within the territory of the State has a 
guaranteed right to legal remedy.?
 
Article 10?
 
The death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and anyone sentenced to 
death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.?
 
Article 11?
 
The death penalty shall under no circumstances be imposed for a political offence.?
 
Article 12?
The death penalty shall not be inflicted on a person under 18 years of age, on a pregnant 
woman prior to her delivery or on a nursing mother within two years from the date on which 
she gave birth.?
 
Article 13?
 
(a) The States parties shall protect every person in their territory from being subjected to 
physical or mental torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. They shall take effective 
measures to prevent such acts and shall regard the practice thereof, or participation therein, as 
a punishable offence.?
 
(b) No medical or scientific experimentation shall be carried out on any person without his 
free consent.?
Article 14?
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No one shall be imprisoned on the ground of his proven inability to meet a debt or fulfil any 
civil obligation.?
 
Article 15?
 
Persons sentenced to a penalty of deprivation of liberty shall be treated with humanity.?
 
Article 16?
 
No one shall be tried twice for the same offence.?
Anyone against whom such proceedings are brought shall have the right to challenge their 
legality and to demand his release.?
Anyone who is the victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall be entitled to compensation.?
 
Article 17?
 
Privacy shall be inviolable and any infringement thereof shall constitute an offence. This 
privacy includes private family affairs, the inviolability of the home and the confidentiality of 
correspondence and other private means of communication.?
 
Article 18?
 
Everyone shall have the inherent right to recognition as a person before the law.?
 
Article 19?
 
The people are the source of authority and every citizen of full legal age shall have the right 
of political participation, which he shall exercise in accordance with the law.?
 
Article 20?
Every individual residing within the territory of a State shall have the right to liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose his place of residence in any part of the said territory, 
within the limits of the law.?
 
Article 21?
 
No citizen shall be arbitrarily or unlawfully prevented from leaving any Arab country, 
including his own, nor prohibited from residing, or compelled to reside, in any part of his 
country.?
 
Article 22?
 
No citizen shall be expelled from his country or prevented from returning thereto.?
 
 
 
 
 
Article 23?
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Every citizen shall have the right to seek political asylum in other countries in order to escape 
persecution. This right shall not be enjoyed by persons facing prosecution for an offence 
under the ordinary law. Political refugees shall not be extraditable.?
 
Article 24?
 
No citizen shall be arbitrarily deprived of his original nationality, nor shall his right to acquire 
another nationality be denied without a legally valid reason.?
 
Article 25?
 
Every citizen has a guaranteed right to own private property. No citizen shall under any 
circumstances be divested of all or any part of his property in an arbitrary or unlawful manner.?
 
Article 26?
 
Everyone has a guaranteed right to freedom of belief, thought and opinion.?
 
Article 27?
 
Adherents of every religion have the right to practise their religious observances and to 
manifest their views through expression. practice or teaching, without prejudice to the rights 
of others. No restrictions shall be imposed on the exercise of freedom of belief, thought and 
opinion except as provided by law.?
 
Article 28?
 
All citizens have the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No restrictions 
shall be placed on the exercise of this right unless so required by the exigencies of national 
security, public safety or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.?
 
Article 29?
 
The State guarantees the right to form trade unions and the right to strike within the limits laid 
down by law.?
 
Article 30?
 
The State guarantees every citizen's right to work in order to secure for himself a standard of 
living that meets the basic requirements of life. The State also guarantees every citizen's right 
to comprehensive social security.?
 
Article 31?
 
Free choice of work is guaranteed and forced labour is prohibited. Compelling a person to 
perform work under the terms of a court judgement shall not be deemed to constitute forced 
labour.?
 
Article 32?
 89 
 
The State shall ensure that its citizens enjoy equality of opportunity in regard to work, as well 
as a fair wage and equal remuneration for work of equal value.?
 
Article 33?
 
Every citizen shall have the right of access to public office in his country.?
 
Article 34?
 
The eradication of illiteracy is a binding obligation and every citizen has a right to education. 
Primary education, at the very least, shall be compulsory and free and both secondary and 
university education shall be made easily accessible to all.?
 
Article 35?
 
Citizens have a right to live in an intellectual and cultural environment in which Arab 
nationalism is a source of pride, in which human rights are sanctified and in which racial, 
religious and other forms of discrimination are rejected and international cooperation and the 
cause of world peace are supported.?
 
Article 36?
 
Everyone has the right to participate in cultural life, as well as the right to enjoy literary and 
artistic works and to be given opportunities to develop his artistic, intellectual and creative 
talents.?
 
Article 37?
 
Minorities shall not be deprived of their right to enjoy their culture or to follow the teachings 
of their religions.?
 
Article 38?
 
(a) The family is the basic unit of society, whose protection it shall enjoy.?
 
(b) The State undertakes to provide outstanding care and special protection for the family, 
mothers, children and the aged.?
 
Article 39?
 
Young persons have the right to be afforded the most ample opportunities for physical and 
mental development.?
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III?
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Article 40?
 
(a) The States members of the League's Council which are parties to the Charter shall elect a 
Committee of Experts on Human Rights by secret ballot.?
 
(b) The Committee shall consist of seven members nominated by the member States Parties to 
the Charter. The initial elections to the Committee shall be held six months after the Charter's 
entry into force. The Committee shall not include more than one person from the same State.?
 
(c) The Secretary-General shall request the member States to submit their candidates two 
months before the scheduled date of the elections.?
 
(d) The candidates, who must be highly experienced and competent in the Committee's field 
of work, shall serve in their personal capacity with full impartiality and integrity.?
 
(e) The Committee's members shall be elected for a three-year term which, in the case of three 
of them, shall be renewable for one further term, their names being selected by lot. The 
principle of rotation shall be observed as far as possible.?
 
(f) The Committee shall elect its chairman and shall draw up its rules of procedure specifying 
its method of operation.?
 
(g) Meetings of the Committee shall be convened by the Secretary-General at the 
Headquarters of the League's Secretariat. With the Secretary-General's approval, the 
Committee may also meet in another Arab country if the exigencies of its work so require.?
 
Article 41?
 
1. The States Parties shall submit reports to the Committee of Experts on Human Rights in the 
following manner :?
 
(a) An initial report one year after the date of the Charter's entry into force.?
 
(b) Periodic reports every three years.?
 
(c) Reports containing the replies of States to the Committee's questions.?
 
2. The Committee shall consider the reports submitted by the member States Parties to the 
Charter in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article.?
 
3. The Committee shall submit a report, together with the views and comments of the States, 
to the Standing Committee on Human Rights at the Arab League.?
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part IV?
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Article 42?
 
(a) The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States shall submit the present Charter, after 
its approval by the Council of the League, to the member States for signature and ratification 
or accession.?
 
(b) The present Charter shall enter into effect two months after the date of deposit of the 
seventh instrument of ratification or accession with the Secretariat of the League of Arab 
States.?
 
Article 43?
 
Following its entry into force, the present Charter shall become binding on each State two 
months after the date of the deposit of Its instrument of ratification or accession with the 
Secretariat. The Secretary-General shall notify the member States of the deposit of each 
instrument of ratification or accession."?
 
Footnotes?
 
(1) The Charter was adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States by its resolution  
5437 (102nd regular session) on 15 September 1994. The original text may be obtained from 
the League of Arab States, Permanent Delegation to the United Nations in Geneva, 9 rue du 
Valais, CH-1202 Geneva.?
 
(2) Translation by the United Nations, obtained from the Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. 
A French translation made by Mohammed Amin AI-Midani has been published in RUDH, 
Vol. 7 (1995), p. 212 ff.?
 
(3) The 22 member States of the League of Arab States are : Jordan. United Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti. Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic. Somalia. 
Iraq, Oman. Palestine, Qatar, Comoros, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Egypt, 
Morocco, Mauritania, Yemen.?
 
(4) Adopted on 5 August 1990.?
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